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Abstract
A common finding of the optimal unemployment insurance literature is that the
optimal UI replacement rate is around 50%, implying that current levels in the US
are close to optimal. However, a key assumption in the existing literature is that un-
employment benefits are the only government spending activity. In this paper I show
that recommendations for optimal UI levels are dramatically reduced when one incor-
porates the fact that UI spending is a small part of overall government spending. This
occurs because the negative impact of UI on income tax revenues implies added welfare
costs, a mechanism that I refer to as a fiscal externality. Using both a calibrated struc-
tural job search model and a “sufficient statistics” method that relies on reduced-form
elasticities, I find that the optimal replacement rate drops to zero once fiscal external-
ities are incorporated. However, I also consider the possibility that more generous UI
could increase reservation wages and thus potentially increase the tax base, and I show
that this second fiscal externality could have important effects on the results, with an
optimal replacement rate which could rise above 70%.
Keywords: unemployment insurance, fiscal externality, job search, sufficient statistics,
government spending
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1 Introduction
A large literature studies the optimal provision of unemployment insurance.1 A common
finding of this literature is that the optimal UI replacement rate is around 50%, implying
that current levels in the US are close to optimal.2 However, a key assumption in the existing
literature is that unemployment benefits are the only spending activity of the government
that needs to be financed with taxes on labour income. In this paper I show that recom-
mendations for optimal UI levels are dramatically reduced when one incorporates the fact
that UI spending is a small part of overall government spending.3
The economics behind this finding are simple and intuitive. When the government makes
UI benefits more generous, the average duration of unemployment spells increases due to
moral hazard, thereby lowering the steady-state level of employment and the tax base used
to finance non-UI spending. Even if the tax rate is increased enough to cover the higher
UI payments, the decrease in the tax base means that the revenues used to finance non-UI
spending are no longer sufficient, implying either that this spending must decrease or that
additional taxes must be levied. It follows that there is an added welfare cost associated
with higher UI benefits relative to the case in which non-UI spending is zero. I refer to these
effects on the non-UI budget as fiscal externalities, and the key message from my analysis is
that these fiscal externalities are quantitatively important.4
I explore the quantitative implications of fiscal externalities for optimal UI using the two
most popular approaches found in the literature. First, I calibrate a structural job search
model to match a set of real-world moments under two scenarios: the first uses an estimate
1A variety of approaches have been used: for example, papers such as Hansen and I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992) and
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) study the issue using calibrated structural models of unemployment, whereas
Baily (1978) and Chetty (2008) are important examples of more reduced-form studies that derive equations
for the welfare consequences of UI as functions of empirical statistics. The central tradeoff of the optimal UI
problem is between the consumption-smoothing and risk-sharing benefits of UI, and the moral hazard costs
of longer durations of unemployment which have been repeatedly found in papers such as Ehrenberg and
Oaxaca (1976), Meyer (1990), and Chetty (2008).
2Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), Wang and Williamson (2002) and Chetty (2008) all argue that welfare
gains from increasing UI from the current level are small.
3UI typically accounts for less than 1% of total government spending in the U.S.
4The interpretation of this phenomenon as an externality is due to the fact that individuals do not
internalize the cost of reduced tax revenues when making their job search decisions. Fiscal externalities can
also be thought of as an application of the Theory of the Second Best, in which optimal government policy
must be considered in the context of a labour market, and in particular a job search decision, that is already
distorted by income taxes. When UI lengthens durations of unemployment, this increases an already large
distortion, and since the deadweight loss of a distortion is generally convex in the size of the distortion, the
welfare costs of UI are amplified.
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of total government spending, while the second ignores all government spending other than
UI. I simulate the model and solve numerically for the optimal replacement rate in each case,
permitting a comparison of the results across the two scenarios.
The second approach is a “sufficient statistics” method that relies on reduced-form elas-
ticities: I solve a simple two-period model as in the seminal work of Baily (1978), deriving an
expression for the optimal level of benefits which can be written in terms of a few empirical
values, which are therefore sufficient statistics for welfare. I then use a statistical extrapo-
lation of the sufficient statistics, approximating their values at alternative UI replacement
rates, to calculate numerical results for the optimal replacement rate.
For my benchmark specification, I find that the effect of incorporating fiscal externalities
into the analysis is large. Ignoring non-UI spending, I find the optimal UI replacement rate
to be 37% using the structural approach and 46% using the sufficient statistics method, but
these both drop to zero once fiscal externalities are recognized.
The benchmark specification uses the standard assumption that the wage distribution
is degenerate, so that the only effect of UI is to lengthen unemployment durations. The
logic of my analysis suggests that it is also important to consider the potential effects of
UI on the wage received on a new job. If more generous UI increases reservation wages,
encouraging individuals to find better matches and thereby increasing wages, this would
increase the tax base and create offsetting effects to those emphasized above. I therefore
extend the earlier analyses to consider this additional margin. While recent studies suggest
that this wage effect is small, I nonetheless find that values at the high end of the empirically
plausible range have dramatic quantitative effects on the optimal provision of UI: I now find
that fiscal externalities can increase optimal replacement rates to 71% using the structural
approach and 58% using the sufficient statistics method. A key implication is that better
estimates of the effects of UI on re-employment wages are critical to the determination of
optimal UI generosity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the dynamic job search
model, and includes a discussion of the calibration and the results. In section 3, I describe
a two-period model based on Baily (1978), and solve for the welfare derivative and optimal
UI equation and present numerical results. Section 4 extends the analysis to a case in which
UI has significant effects on subsequent wages, and section 5 concludes.
2
2 Calibrated Job Search Model
In this section, my analysis will be based on the model from Lentz (2009), which is a typical
single-agent model, incorporating endogenous search intensity and private asset accumula-
tion, as well as being intuitive and straightforward to simulate. My only modifications are
the introduction of government spending outside of UI and a simplified functional form for
the effort cost of job search. The first subsection describes the model, while the second
explains the calibration; I then present the numerical results, and discuss the effects of fiscal
externalities on the estimated optimal benefit level.
2.1 Model Setup
The model features a representative infinitely-lived risk-averse agent who makes stochastic
transitions between states of employment and unemployment. When unemployed, the agent
receives an after-tax UI benefit equal to b, with infinite potential duration,5 and chooses
search intensity st subject to a convex search cost function e(st), where st is the probability
of receiving a job offer.6 All jobs have an identical wage y, and jobs end exogenously at a
constant rate of δ per period. Agents receive utility from consumption U(ct) in each period,
and τ will represent the tax rate. Finally, agents cannot borrow, but can make savings
which earn interest at a rate of i per period, and face a discount factor of β, where a period
represents a week.
In all periods and states, agents decide on their level of consumption, while unemployed
agents also choose how hard to search for a job. It is convenient to formulate the worker’s
optimization problem using recursive methods; therefore, let Ve(k) represent the maximum
present value of being employed with assets equal to k, while Vu(k) will be the analogous
value of unemployment, and let k′ represent next period’s assets. The worker’s problem can
then be written as:
Ve(k) = max
k′∈Γy(1−τ)(k)
[U((1 + i)k + y(1− τ)− k′) + β[(1− δ)Ve(k
′) + δVu(k
′)]]
Vu(k) = max
k′∈Γb(k),s≥0
[U((1 + i)k + b− k′)− e(s) + β[sVe(k
′) + (1− s)Vu(k
′)]]
5By assuming that benefits are constant and never expire, I keep the analysis simple and focus on only
one dimension of the optimal UI problem, namely the optimal level of benefits.
6This simplified specification allows for a closed-form solution for the individual’s search decision.
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where Γz(k) = (k
′ ∈ R|0 ≤ k′ ≤ (1 + i)k + z) is the set of permissable asset values.7
The agent is representative of a continuum of identical agents, and therefore I can consider
the economy-wide steady-state, in which the government budget constraint is:8
(1− u)yτ = ub+G
where u is the unemployment rate and G is the level of exogenous non-UI government
spending.9 The government chooses b and τ subject to this constraint to maximize steady-
state expected utility,10 and I will compare the results when the best estimate of G is used
with the results obtained when I assume G = 0.
2.2 Calibration of the Model
Calibration requires choosing functional forms and parameter values, in order to be able to
simulate the model. For functional forms, I assume constant relative risk-aversion utility
with risk-aversion parameter R, so U(c) = c
1−R
1−R
, and I borrow the search cost function from
Chetty (2008): e(s) = (θs)
1+κ
1+κ
, until s = s¯, beyond which the marginal cost is infinite.11
Choosing a baseline value of UI benefits requires that I confront the fact that, while the
model features infinite-potential-duration UI for simplicity, not all unemployed individuals
actually receive UI, either because their benefits have expired or because they do not take
up benefits. Simply assuming that everyone receives UI would imply a much larger size
of the UI program than is the case in reality, and the relative size of UI spending and
other programs defines the size of fiscal externalities. Therefore, I follow the approach of
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) in deflating benefits in my model to be equal in expectation
to real-world finite-duration benefits. That is, I multiply the replacement rate by 0.8, which is
the approximate take-up rate over 1990-2005 found by Ebenstein and Stange (2010),12 and by
7As in Lentz (2009), the numerical solutions always appear to yield concave value functions by asset level.
8Assuming a single proportional tax keeps the government budget constraint simple; the basic result will
hold with a more complex tax system if taxes paid remain an increasing function of income.
9In principle, G could be made endogenous, but this would add considerable complexity while providing
little new insight into the main point. If exogenous, G does not need to be accounted for in the individual’s
utility function.
10By maximizing steady-state welfare, I keep with the usual approach in the literature and do not account
for transitional dynamics.
11Thus, s¯ is the maximum feasible search intensity; in the simulations, this upper limit will be binding in
very few instances.
12This accounts for the fact that the empirical quantities used later are defined for the entire population
that is eligible for UI, regardless of whether they take up benefits; Gruber (1997) argues that this is in fact
the policy-relevant population, because government can control benefit eligibility but not benefit receipt.
4
15.8
24.3
, which is the ratio of mean compensated unemployment duration to mean total duration
in the Mathematica sample of Chetty (2008).13 Therefore, if r is the real-world replacement
rate and τ0 the baseline tax rate, b = r(1− τ0)y(0.8)
(
15.8
24.3
)
is the corresponding value of the
infinite-duration benefit in my model.14 An alternative option is to explicitly model benefits
that expire after 6 months, and while this is less simple to implement numerically, I show in
appendix B.2 that the results are similar.
The selected parameter values are summarized in Table 1. The job separation rate
is set to δ = 1
260
to correspond with a median job duration of 5 years measured by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics in January 2006 for high-school graduates, a group which is a
reasonable proxy for UI recipients. For the interest rate i, I follow the example of Hansen
and I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992) and Chetty (2008) in setting it to zero.15 The wage y is normalized
to one, and I use R = 2, which is a standard value for the coefficient of relative risk-aversion
in studies of UI.16 For the upper limit of search intensity, I use s¯ = 0.5, which means that it
is not possible for an individual to guarantee finding a job immediately.
Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Definition Value(s)
δ job separation rate 1
260
i real interest rate 0
y per-period wage 1
r0 baseline replacement rate 0.46
τ0 baseline tax rate 0.23
R coefficient of relative risk-aversion 2
s¯ maximum search intensity 0.5
θ search cost parameter TBD
κ search cost parameter TBD
β discount factor TBD
I also select initial values of r0 = 0.46 and τ0 = 0.23; the former is the mean effective
replacement rate over 1988-2010 reported by the U.S. Department of Labor, while the latter
13Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) make a slightly different adjustment, finding the average replacement
rate for all unemployed individuals whether eligible for UI or not, across both UI and social assistance,
accounting for UI benefit exhaustion.
14I assume that when r changes, benefits continue to be taxed at the baseline rate.
15Chetty (2008) finds that unemployed individuals tend to have little in the way of long-term savings, and
Hansen and I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992) argues that previous findings of near-zero average real returns on “highly
liquid short-term debt” justify the assumption of a non-interest-bearing asset.
16For example, Chetty and Saez (2010) use R = 2, and Lentz (2009) estimates a value of 2.21. Several
sensitivity analyses in appendix B.1 consider alternative values of R.
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incorporates a 15% federal rate of the typical UI recipient, 5% for a typical state income
tax, and 3% for the Medicare tax.17 In the case where I assume G = 0, meanwhile, the tax
rate is that which pays for UI benefits, and I assume that the payroll tax is paid only by
employees, so benefits are untaxed.
The remaining parameters, θ, κ and β, are set to make the model match a set of moments
from the real world. The moments used are the unemployment rate u, the percentage gap
between average consumption when employed and unemployed E(ce)−E(cu)
E(ce)
, and the elasticity
of the unemployment rate with respect to benefits, which I denote as Eub =
b
u
du
db
.
The unemployment rate is often used to calibrate job search models, and while all three
moments jointly determine the parameter values, u is especially informative about the level of
the search cost function, which is primarily determined by θ. Eub , meanwhile, is informative
about the curvature parameter κ. Finally, the consumption gap is closely related to workers’
ability to maintain a buffer stock of assets, so E(ce)−E(cu)
E(ce)
primarily identifies the discount
factor.18 These three moments are also related to the sufficient statistics that will be used
later in the paper.
The specific values used for the moments are summarized in Table 2, and are as follows.
The unemployment rate u is set to 0.054 to match the average unemployment rate among
high-school graduates during 1992-2010; combined with r0 and τ0, this implicitly defines
G = 0.208. Gruber (1997) estimates a relationship of E(ce)−E(cu)
E(ce)
= 0.222 − 0.265r,19 which
implies a value of 0.1001 at baseline.20 Finally, Chetty (2008) estimates an elasticity of
17The employee and employer shares of the Medicare tax add up to 2.9%. 23% is meant to represent a best
approximation of a single tax rate applying to earned income and UI. In terms of the tax rate applying to UI,
FICA taxes are not applicable to UI benefits, and some state taxes also do not apply to UI benefits, whereas
I also ignore the possibility of some individuals being in higher tax brackets, due to their own income or that
of a spouse. A marginal earned income tax rate of τ0 = 0.23, meanwhile, likely represents a conservative
estimate, as I ignore the Social Security tax on the grounds that it is more of a pension contribution than a
tax, and I also ignore the fact that some UI recipients may be on the downward-sloping part of the EITC,
which would significantly increase the marginal tax on earned income.
18My decision to set the discount factor to match a moment is unusual, as the standard approach is simply
to choose a “reasonable” value; however, there is no definite consensus on the right “reasonable” value. An
annual discount rate of around 4-5% is typical, but to take opposite extremes, Acemoglu and Shimer (2000)
use an annual rate of nearly 11%, whereas Coles (2008) produces results for a zero discount rate. Lentz
(2009) uses a value of 5.1%, but finds that his results are very sensitive to the gap between the interest and
discount rates, motivating my attempt to use real-world data to pin down this parameter.
19Given the difficulties of obtaining good quality data on consumption across states of employment and
unemployment, Gruber’s data is on food consumption from the PSID; he estimates the year-to-year drop in
consumption for individuals who were employed in year t − 1 and unemployed in t, which is a reasonable
approximation to the consumption gap between average unemployed and employed individuals.
20In this model, it is difficult to generate a consumption gap which declines with b, because I consider
the steady-state, and in steady-state agents accumulate fewer assets as b increases. The variances of U(c)
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unemployment durations with respect to benefits of 0.53,21 though this estimate is based on
a sample of UI recipients, whereas the consumption estimates in Gruber (1997) are from a
sample of unemployed workers who were initially eligible for UI, regardless of whether they
were actually receiving benefits. Therefore, as with the benefit level, I need to adjust for
benefit non-receipt, and I follow Gruber’s recommendation and multiply the elasticity by
0.48, the derivative of benefit receipt to benefit eligibility in his sample.22 If the average
duration of unemployment is D, this gives EDb =
b
D
dD
db
= 0.2544, and the fact that u = D
D+ 1
δ
means that Eub = (1− u)E
D
b = 0.946× 0.2544 = 0.2407.
Table 2: Moments
Parameter Definition Value
u unemployment rate 0.054
E(ce)−E(cu)
E(ce)
consumption gap between employment 0.222− 0.265r0 = 0.1001
and unemployment
Eub =
b
u
du
db
elasticity of u wrt b 0.946× 0.48× 0.53 = 0.2407
The model will be calibrated twice, once for G = 0 and once for the true G = 0.208.
In this way, given each set of starting assumptions about the size of government, I find the
parameters that match the real-world moments, and then find the level of UI that is optimal
in each case,23 allowing me to compare the results with fiscal externalities to those from the
usual approach.
2.3 Numerical Results
To numerically solve the model, I use value function iteration, and the parameters used are
displayed in Table 3, where I report the annual discount rate ρ instead of the weekly discount
factor β =
(
1
1+ρ
) 1
52
; the details of the numerical methods are explained in detail in appendix
and U ′(c) do, however, decrease with b. Since my later sufficient statistics analysis uses Gruber’s estimated
relationship directly in the welfare derivative, including the negative relationship between benefits and the
consumption gap, this strengthens my claim to be testing the robustness of my conclusions to different
assumptions.
21This estimate is close to the middle of the typical range of estimates in the literature; Chetty (2008)
describes the usual range of estimates as 0.4 to 0.8, while Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) claim that their
own value of 0.5 is “in the middle range of the available estimates.”
220.48 is also very close to my value of 0.8 × 15.824.3 ≃ 0.52 for the fraction of time that initially eligible
unemployed individuals receive benefits, a closely related quantity.
23This is not a comparative statics exercise; I am studying the effect of fiscal externalities on optimal
UI calculations, not the impact on optimal UI of increasing the size of government. Governments’ fiscal
activities have always been much more extensive than just UI, but this has been ignored by the optimal UI
literature, and I want to know how much the estimated optimum changes if this fact is no longer ignored.
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A.1, which also contains the resulting moments.24 The results for the optimal replacement
rates and estimated welfare gains can be found in Table 4; the column labelled “Welf. Gain”
expresses the gain from moving from r = 0.46 to the optimum as percentage points of initial
spending on UI, whereas the next column, labelled “Diff.”, displays the welfare gain from
moving between the replacement rate believed to be optimal when G = 0 and the “true”
optimum.25
Table 3: Calibrated Parameters
G = 0.208 G = 0
ρ 0.01090 0.01076
θ 32.0 26.3
κ 0.527 0.560
Table 4: Optimal Replacement Rates & Welfare Gains
r Welf. Gain Diff.
G = 0.208 0.00 11.81 6.80
G = 0 0.37 0.45 6.33
When G is assumed to be zero, the optimal replacement rate is 37%. Previous results
from the existing literature which implicitly make this same assumption are summarized in
Table 5, which shows that 37% is within the existing range of estimates, though towards the
low end. However, a positive value of G dramatically reduces the optimal replacement rate
to zero,26 as the added welfare cost of providing UI completely outweighs the gains from
consumption-smoothing. The welfare gain obtained from moving to the optimum is nearly
12% of current spending on UI, and since during 2001-2010, the average size of UI spending
24An over-identifying moment can be generated from the asset distribution, by comparing my simulated
steady-state distribution to the asset distribution in the SIPP data of Chetty (2008). My model does not
contain motives for saving other than self-insurance against unemployment, and I also restrict assets to be
non-negative, so I cannot match the long left and right tails of a real-world distribution, but I can consider
the median of my distribution. In the four cases I consider, the median level of assets generated by the model
amounts to between 40% and 62% of a year’s pre-tax labour income. If I assume that half of housing equity
can be counted as liquid wealth, I find that the median liquid wealth in Chetty’s sample is about 40% of
mean annual income; if all of housing equity is counted, then median wealth is about 70% of mean income.
Therefore, the centre of the asset distribution is on the right order of magnitude.
25I estimate the welfare gain per worker per period, convert this to dollars using a base of mean consumption
while unemployed, divide by per-period spending on UI and multiply by 100.
26More accurately, the optimum is very close to zero, as close as computationally feasible; an actual zero
benefit level, along with a zero interest rate and an upper limit to search intensity below one, would mean
that zero consumption in a period occurs with a probability that is bounded away from zero, with expected
utility equal to negative infinity.
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was $59 billion, this implies a welfare gain of about $7 billion per year. Meanwhile, the
welfare gain of moving from the G = 0 optimum to the G = 0.208 optimum is nearly 7% of
UI spending.
Table 5: Numerical Results from Structural Studies of Optimal UI
Paper Optimal Replacement Rate
Hansen and I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992) 0.15∗ (with moral hazard)/0.65 (without)
Davidson and Woodbury (1997) 0.66∗/1.30∗∗
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) > 0.94∗ (with optimal tax)
Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) > 0.4∗∗
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) 0.38− 0.42∗
Wang and Williamson (2002) 0.24∗/0.56∗∗
Coles and Masters (2006) 0.76∗
Lentz (2009) 0.43− 0.82∗
* corresponds to infinite-duration UI, ** to finite-duration (typically 26 weeks)
Figures 1 through 3 illustrate graphically the implications of changing UI generosity.
Figure 1 shows how the tax base 1 − u varies with the after-tax benefit b (which takes a
baseline value of 0.184 when G = 0.208 and 0.239 when G = 0),27 while Figure 2 shows total
UI spending as a function of b. UI is a small program, one that would still account for a small
fraction of overall spending even if benefits were greatly increased, as illustrated in Figure
2. However, UI has an impact on the tax base that is significant, and which is considerably
larger when G is large. These results are combined in Figure 3, which shows the effect of
UI spending on the budget-balancing tax rate: taxes rise much more rapidly with b in the
G = 0.208 case than when I abstract from G. Each dollar given to an unemployed person
costs more to the government when G is large, and this impact on the tax base and therefore
on the equilibrium tax rate is the reason behind the optimal level of UI being reduced to
zero when G is large.
I have also performed an extensive series of sensitivity analyses, with results that are
displayed in appendix B.1. First of all, I present results with R = 5, a value that Chetty
(2008) finds to be consistent with large income effects of UI, and I show that although the
optimal replacement rates are higher, the basic result is robust to higher risk-aversion: the
optimal replacement rate drops significantly from 72% to 46% due to fiscal externalities.
27Since b is the after-tax benefit, a given value of b corresponds to a different replacement rate in the
G = 0.208 and G = 0 cases, because an analysis that assumes G = 0 ignores income taxes. In this sense, the
results in Table 4 understate the effect of fiscal externalities in after-tax UI dollars.
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Figure 1: Tax Base = 1− u
I then consider different values of a wide variety of parameters and moments used in the
baseline analysis, for both R = 2 and R = 5, and show that the results are strongly robust to
these modifications, with the partial exception of the case with a positive interest rate, which
significantly reduces the optimal benefit level, all the way to near zero if R = 2 even in the
absence of fiscal externalities. In appendix B.2, I have also extended the model to include
benefits that expire after 6 months; the results are very similar to the baseline, indicating
that my conclusions hold with a more realistic (but less simple) approach to modelling
unemployment benefits.
Thus, I can conclude that the overall results of the analysis are robust, simple and
striking: the minor modification of a standard search model to include non-UI spending
can substantially affect optimal UI calculations, with the baseline finding that the optimal
replacement rate drops from around 40% to zero.
3 Sufficient Statistics Approach
The structural approach has numerous strengths, but it is difficult to present a clear demon-
stration of the mechanisms at work in this framework,28 and so I now switch my focus to a a
28Shimer and Werning (2007) state that structural models “rely heavily on the entire structure of the
model and its calibration, which sometimes obscures the economic mechanisms at work and their empirical
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Figure 2: UI Spending
simpler and more reduced-form model of unemployment in the sufficient statistics tradition.
This approach will permit a more detailed, step-by-step analysis of fiscal externalities in the
context of UI, and will generate an analytical solution as an intuitive function of observable
empirical quantities. The sufficient statistics approach has been used recently by Chetty
(2008) and Shimer and Werning (2007), but I will focus on Martin Baily’s (1978) original
seminal paper in optimal UI; the formula generated by his two-period model of unemploy-
ment is used by Gruber (1997), and Chetty (2006) demonstrates that it applies to a wide
range of job search models.
The first subsection presents the model and derives a general version of the optimal
benefit equation, while the second explores this equation in further detail and provides
the equations needed to perform the numerical analysis, and the third subsection presents
numerical results.
3.1 Baily (1978) Model & Optimal Benefit Equation
The only modification that I make to Baily’s model is to add G to the government budget
constraint; the notation from Baily’s paper is also altered to make it more compatible with
the notation used earlier. The model is more reduced-form than the structural model earlier,
validity.”
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Figure 3: Budget-Balancing Tax Rates
but captures many of the same features, and the simplicity of the model makes it well suited
to an exposition of the effects of fiscal externalities.
In Baily’s model, time is finite and consists of two periods,29 with the interest and discount
rates both set to zero. In the first period, the representative worker is employed at an
exogenous wage y,30 and between periods they face a risk of unemployment: with exogenous
probability δ the worker loses their job and becomes unemployed, whereas they keep their
initial job at the same wage for the entire second period with probability 1 − δ. If the
worker becomes unemployed, they choose search effort e (normalized into income units) and
a desired wage yn. They will then spend a fraction 1 − s of the second period unemployed
and the remaining s ∈ (0, 1) at a new job at wage yn,
31 where s is a deterministic function
of e and yn:
32
s = s(e, yn),
∂s
∂e
> 0,
∂s
∂yn
< 0.
Individuals receive utility from consumption in each period according to the continuous
29Baily meant this to represent a two-year time horizon, but the model could also stand for a world with
a longer time horizon divided into two halves.
30In an extension in appendix I.4, I consider the effect of allowing choice over initial labour supply.
31yn is assumed to be deterministic, such that a worker defines the type of job (i.e. wage level) that they
will search for, and will eventually find such a job, with it taking longer to find high-wage jobs.
32In appendix I.1, I examine the consequences of a stochastic s.
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function U(c), where U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0. k represents first-period savings, so overall
expected utility is given by:
V = U(c1) + (1− δ)U(ce) + δU(cu) (1)
where c1 = y(1− τ)− k, ce = y(1− τ) + k and cu = (1− s)(b− e) + syn(1− τ) + k,
33 and τ
remains the income tax rate and b the after-tax UI benefit.
The government budget constraint over the two periods is:
[(2− δ)y + δsyn]τ = δ(1− s)b+ 2G (2)
where G again represents per-period exogenous government expenditures.
The next step is to evaluate the derivative of social welfare with respect to UI ben-
efits. From (1), the worker’s lifetime expected utility can be written generally as V =
V (e, yn, k; b, τ); the government sets the values of b and τ , and the worker chooses {e, yn, k}
to maximize V taking {b, τ} as given. The government planner has equally-weighted utilitar-
ian preferences, and therefore wants to maximize V at the individual’s optimum, choosing b
and τ so that the government budget constraint is satisfied in equilibrium. Since the individ-
ual chooses {e, yn, k} to maximize V , the partial derivatives with respect to these individual
choices are zero: ∂V
∂e
= ∂V
∂yn
= ∂V
∂k
= 0. In other words, for a small change in b, behavioural
responses have no first-order effect on welfare, and the envelope theorem implies that the
welfare derivative can be written as a function of the two partial derivatives ∂V
∂b
and ∂V
∂τ
and
the derivative of the government budget constraint:
dV
db
=
∂V
∂b
+
∂V
∂τ
dτ
db
. (3)
Loosely speaking, ∂V
∂b
represents the marginal benefit of increased UI, which is equivalent
in utility terms to a marginal increase in consumption while unemployed. The second term,
meanwhile, represents the marginal cost in the form of higher taxes, with dτ
db
identifying the
size of the tax increase needed to pay for higher benefits and ∂V
∂τ
the welfare cost of higher
taxes in terms of lost consumption. The partial derivatives are:
∂V
∂b
= δ(1− s)U ′(cu) (4)
33The assumption that, if the worker loses their job, utility in the second period is defined over total
consumption implies no credit constraints within a period: the worker can borrow as much as necessary to
smooth consumption during the second period. I consider a relaxation of this assumption in appendix I.2.
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∂V
∂τ
= −yU ′(c1)− (1− δ)yU
′(ce)− δsynU
′(cu). (5)
Therefore, the welfare derivative is:
dV
db
= δ(1− s)U ′(cu)− [yU
′(c1) + (1− δ)yU
′(ce) + δsynU
′(cu)]
dτ
db
. (6)
At the optimal level of UI, the right-hand side of (6) must be equal to zero. As in Baily’s
analysis, the goal is to express the right-hand side in terms of observable empirical quantities,
to provide a simple mapping from these empirical quantities into the optimal value of the
replacement rate.
As in Baily, I begin by replacing U ′(c1) and U
′(ce) using the individual’s first-order
condition for saving and a first-order Taylor series expansion of first-period marginal utility
U ′(c1) around U
′(cu), specifically U
′(c1) = U
′(cu) + ∆cU
′′(θ), where ∆c = c1 − cu and θ is
between cu and c1. As demonstrated in appendix C.1, this allows
dV
db
to be written in terms
of U ′(cu) and U
′′(θ):
dV
db
= −2y∆cU ′′(θ)
dτ
db
− [(2− δ)y + δsyn]U
′(cu)
[
dτ
db
− ω
]
(7)
where ω = δ(1−s)
(2−δ)y+δsyn
. To further simplify this expression, I follow Baily in making two
additional assumptions, which are summarized below.
Assumption 1. In the analysis in this section, I assume that the wage distribution is de-
generate with yn = y.
Assumption 2. In the analysis in this section, I assume that c1U
′′(θ) = cuU
′′(cu).
Given these two assumptions,34 and setting dV
db
equal to zero, the following proposition
characterizes the optimal level of UI benefits.
Proposition 1. Given assumptions 1 and 2, the equation for the optimal value of b is:
∆c
c1
R = (1− u)
dτ
db
− ω
dτ
db
. (8)
34Assumption 1 replicates the standard assumption of no effects of UI on wages, which I also made in
section 2. Assumption 2, meanwhile, is necessary if I am to incorporate the second derivative of utility
terms into an observable empirical quantity, specifically a coefficient of relative risk-aversion. Appendix C.1
describes this assumption in greater detail.
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where R = −cuU
′′(cu)
U ′(cu)
is the coefficient of relative risk-aversion and u = δ(1−s)
2
is the unem-
ployment rate. Equivalently, using elasticities, the optimal UI equation is:
∆c
c1
R = (1− u)
Eτb − ψ
Eτb
. (9)
where Eτb =
b
τ
dτ
db
is the elasticity of τ with respect to b, and ψ = ωb
τ
= ub
ub+G
is the fraction of
total government expenditures allocated to UI.
Proof. The proof of this result can be found in appendix C.1.
These equations state the condition that must hold at the optimum; even though b does
not appear explicitly, only a value of b that causes (12) to hold can be optimal.
3.2 Analysis of Optimal Benefit Equation
In order to be able to use either of the equations derived above, I need to evaluate the
response of taxes to benefits. I begin by evaluating dτ
db
, and Assumption 1 tells us not only
that yn = y, but also that
dyn
db
= 0; therefore, total differentiation of the government budget
constraint (2) gives:
dτ
db
=
δ(1− s)− δbds
db
− δτy ds
db
(2− δ + δs)y
. (10)
The three terms in the numerator represent three separate components of the response of
taxes to benefits. I will call the first the “mechanical effect”: even if there is no behavioural
response to UI, if b increases, the tax rate must increase to compensate, and δ(1−s)
(2−δ+δs)y
rep-
resents the size of this increase. The second component will be referred to as the “duration
effect,” and captures the fact that, if higher benefits increase the duration of unemployment,
this increases the total amount of benefits received over time, requiring a further tax increase.
Finally, I will refer to the third component as the “revenue effect”: longer unemployment
durations also reduce the amount of taxes paid on labour income, raising the required tax
increase still further. Notice that while the magnitude of the duration effect doesn’t depend
on the size of government, the revenue effect is multiplied by τ ; this highlights the impor-
tance of the standard assumption that τ is a small payroll tax, rather than a large income
tax, as that has led to a significant understatement of the revenue effect of UI.
Writing in terms of elasticities, I can solve for Eτb :
Eτb = ψ +
(
ψ +
u
1− u
)
EDb (11)
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where EDb =
b
1−s
d(1−s)
db
is the elasticity of unemployment durations with respect to b. The
three components of the tax response are apparent here as well: the first ψ is the mechanical
effect, while the ψ and u
1−u
multiplying EDb represent the duration effect and the revenue
effect respectively.
I can now explain (9) as an intuitive representation of the tradeoff between marginal
benefits and costs of increased UI (the interpretation of (8) is exactly equivalent). The
left-hand side represents the welfare gain from increased UI in the form of consumption-
smoothing, which is increasing both in the magnitude of risk-aversion and the consumption
shock upon unemployment. To interpret the right-hand side, note that since ψ is exactly
equal to what I labelled as the mechanical effect,
Eτ
b
−ψ
Eτ
b
is the fraction of the total response
of taxes to benefits generated by the duration and revenue effects. Because the mechanical
effect represents a lump-sum transfer of income between employed and unemployed states,
it is not a cost to society, and so
Eτ
b
−ψ
Eτ
b
represents the cost of increased UI in terms of
behavioural distortions. This in turn is weighted by 1− u, which reflects the size of the tax
base.
Therefore, the equation for the optimum is:
∆c
c1
R = (1− u)
(
ψ + u
1−u
)
EDb
ψ +
(
ψ + u
1−u
)
EDb
. (12)
This is the equation which I will use to solve for the optimal value of b, and the quantities
that appear in (12) are the sufficient statistics.
However, even without a numerical analysis, I can draw some important lessons from
(12). First of all, the standard assumption that G = 0 means ψ = 1; u
1−u
is likely to be
a small number, so the mechanical and duration effects are large compared to the revenue
effect, because the taxes that induce the revenue effect are so small.35 However, if G is large,
ψ will be small, meaning that the revenue component will be at least on the same order of
magnitude as the mechanical and duration components.
35Baily implicitly assumes G = 0, and adds an additional assumption which is equivalent to assuming that
ψ +
(
ψ + u1−u
)
EDb = 1 in the denominator of (12), and finds that the result simplifies to:
∆c
c1
R = (1− u)
(
1 +
u
1− u
)
EDb = E
D
b .
The same result is found in Chetty (2006), motivating the conclusion that ∆c
c1
, R and EDb are the three
sufficient statistics for optimal unemployment insurance.
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The significance of a larger revenue component can be shown formally by examining
the effect of G on the welfare derivative. In appendix C.2, I perform some simple algebra
on a derivative normalized into dollar terms, dW
db
=
dV
db
U ′(cu)
, and show that if I assume that
∆c
c1
R < 1−u,36 then for G > 0, dW
db
(b;G)− dW
db
(b; 0) has the same sign as −EDb . The empirical
literature overwhelmingly finds that EDb > 0, which means that if two researchers use (12)
to estimate the baseline welfare derivative, one using G = 0 and the other a positive value
of G, the latter will necessarily find a less positive welfare gain from increasing b.
The researcher with the positiveG will also necessarily find a lower level of optimal UI b∗ if
they assume strict quasi-concavity of welfare and use the method of statistical extrapolation
recommended by Chetty (2009) and previously used by Baily (1978) and Gruber (1997): for
each sufficient statistic in the optimal benefit equation, the available data is used to select
the best functional form of that statistic with respect to b, allowing for an extrapolation of
dW
db
out of sample to find the optimum. If a statistical extrapolation is used to find b∗(0),
and the same statistical extrapolation is used for G > 0, then dW
db
(b∗(0);G) takes the same
sign as −EDb , and if that sign is positive, then by strict quasi-concavity b
∗(G) > b∗(0).
3.3 Numerical Results
In this subsection, I will numerically evaluate (12) to find the optimal replacement rate r, by
selecting baseline values for the sufficient statistics and then using the method of statistical
extrapolation mentioned above. Appendix D provides a detailed explanation of the precise
method used for extrapolation; Chetty (2009) also provides further discussion, but the basic
idea is to select functional forms and parameters for each of the quantities in (12) with
respect to r, to provide the best approximation to how each will change as r is changed.
Many of the quantities for the sufficient statistics have already been used earlier in the
paper, so the discussion will be kept brief. Starting with the functional form of ∆c
c1
, I use
the estimate of ∆c
c1
= 0.222 − 0.265r from Gruber (1997). I also continue to use EDb =
0.48 × 0.53 = 0.2544 and R = 2. The baseline value of r is set to 0.46 as before, and
I again use an initial unemployment rate of u0 = 0.054. Then, let u = φr
ED
b , and it is
easy to solve for φ = 0.0658, allowing me to extrapolate u out of sample. Finally, at
baseline values, ψ = ub
(1−u)τy
= u
1−u
1−τ0
τ
(0.8)
(
15.8
24.3
)
r, and the baseline tax rate is τ0 = 0.23, so
36It is clear from (5) that ∂V
∂τ
< 0, and then ∆c
c1
R < 1− u follows immediately if Assumptions 1 and 2 are
accurate, as those assumptions imply that ∂V
∂τ
= −2yU ′(cu)
[
(1− u)− ∆c
c1
R
]
.
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ψ = 0.7712.64
24.3
ur
(1−u)τ
, which equals 0.0457 at baseline. The parameter values are summarized
in Table 6.37
Table 6: Sufficient Statistics & Parameters
Statistic Value/Extrapolation
∆c
c1
0.222− 0.265r
EDb 0.2544
R 2
r0 0.46
u0 0.054
φ 0.0658
ψ 0.7712.64
24.3
ur
(1−u)τ
I am now prepared to solve the non-linear first-order condition (12) defining the optimal
replacement rate. I solve for the optimal value of r ∈ [0, 2],38 and Table 7 below presents
the optimal r for my parameter values, as well as the results when I set G = 0. The latter
case does not perfectly reproduce Baily’s results; to do so, I also need to make an extra
assumption made by Baily,39 in which case the result is r = 0.3577.
Table 7: Optimal Replacement Rates & Welfare Gains
r Welf. Gain Diff.
G = 0.208 0.0000 46.39 46.34
G = 0 0.4595 0.00 11.26
The results for the optimal replacement rate are remarkably similar to those from the
structural analysis: once again, fiscal externalities cause the optimal replacement rate to
drop to zero, and the drop is more dramatic now, from about 46%. In other words, the usual
analysis would indicate that the current average generosity of UI in the US is optimal, but
adding fiscal externalities is enough to make abolishing UI the optimal policy. Meanwhile, the
estimated welfare gains from the sufficient statistics method tend to be larger than those from
the structural model, largely due to differences in models and assumptions about elasticities;
the estimated welfare gain of moving from r = 0.46 to r = 0 of nearly 50% of initial UI
37These quantities encode all relevant information from underlying structural parameters, making the
welfare equations robust to many modifications and modelling decisions; Chetty (2006) shows that the
results from Baily (1978) are applicable to a far more general class of models.
38I assume that the government is not interested in extracting payments from unemployed workers, so a
zero represents a corner solution.
39Specifically, I need to assume that ψ +
(
ψ + u1−u
)
EDb = 1 in the denominator of (12).
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spending may be implausibly large, as this is due to the assumption that unemployment
goes to zero as r approaches zero.40
The results, however, confirm that fiscal externalities can alter the nature of the optimal
UI problem and significantly change the numerical results; the efficiency costs of UI are larger
than previously recognized, and taking that into account can significantly reduce the optimal
level of UI. In appendix H, I consider the case of R = 5, and show that the results are less
dramatic in this case, though fiscal externalities continue to reduce the optimal replacement
rate by a significant amount.
4 Results with Effects of UI on Wages
To this point, the analysis has proceeded on the assumption that UI has no effect on the wages
received upon finding a new job, and that therefore the only labour market impact of UI is
a lengthening of unemployment durations. This has long been the standard assumption in
the literature; only Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) consider effects of UI on wages in a welfare
analysis of unemployment insurance, and their analysis features a parametrized structural
model with a wage distribution containing only two mass points. However, the idea that
more generous unemployment benefits should raise reservation wages comes out of many
job search models, and the existing empirical literature studying the responsiveness of post-
unemployment wages to unemployment benefits is fairly sparse and reports a wide range of
results, which are summarized in Table 8.41
40If, instead of allowing dW
db
to become very negative as r → 0, I hold it constant at its r = 0.288 value
(which is the peak of dW
db
), which is likely a conservative assumption, the welfare gain drops to about 20%
of UI spending.
41None of the papers listed report coefficients in the form of an elasticity, so their coefficients have been
transformed into approximate elasticities using mean values of wages and benefit levels. Classen (1977) and
Holen (1977) do not provide summary statistics, so I use mean values from Burgess and Kingston (1976),
who use a smaller version of the dataset used by Holen (1977). Additionally, the estimate listed for Meyer
(1989) is from one of 10 individual regressions; the author does not designate a preferred estimate, so the
basic difference-in-differences is used. I do not list papers answering questions other than the effect of higher
benefit levels on wages; I therefore omit Blau and Robins (1986), who find a moderately large but not
significant effect of UI benefits on the wage offer distribution, plus a positive effect of UI on reservation
wages, Fitzenberger and Wilke (2007), who perform a Box-Cox quantile regression and do not arrive at a
single estimate, and McCall and Chi (2008), whose findings correspond to an initial elasticity of 0.10 which
declines over the spell of unemployment. I also omit Gaure, Roed, and Westlie (2008), who find a positive
effect of benefit duration on wages, and Lalive (2007) and Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender (2012), who
do not (the latter paper finds a negative effect); Centeno (2004), Centeno and Novo (2006), and Tatsiramos
(2009), who find that more generous UI leads to greater subsequent job duration, and Portugal and Addison
(2008), who do not. This list of omitted papers, therefore, also leads to an ambiguous conclusion about the
effect of UI on job characteristics.
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Table 8: Results of Empirical Literature on Benefit Elasticity of Wages
Paper Approx. Elasticity 95% Confidence Interval
Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) 0.27 for older men (0.12,0.43)
0.06 for older women (0.03,0.09)
0.04 for young men (-0.04,0.12)
0.02 for young women (-0.06,0.10)
Burgess and Kingston (1976) 0.45 (0.26,0.64)
Classen (1977) 0.03 (-0.16,0.21)
Holen (1977) 0.64 (0.55,0.72)
Meyer (1989) -0.17 (-1.03,0.69)
Maani (1993)* 0.11 (0.02,0.20)
Addison and Blackburn (2000) -0.05 (-0.14,0.05)
*Maani (1993) uses data from New Zealand; all other papers in this table use American data.
The more recent literature has tended to indicate small or zero effects of UI on wages;
Chetty (2008), in particular, focusses on two recent papers, Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007)
and van Ours and Vodopivec (2008), which use natural-experiment methodologies to test for
an effect of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on wages, using European data
(from Austria and Slovenia respectively), and which find no significant effects.42 However,
since the literature covers a wide range of values, in this section of the paper I will extend
both of my approaches to allow for effects of UI benefits on reservation wages and therefore on
observed post-unemployment wages. I begin with an extension of the structural model, and
then I will consider how wage effects can alter the conclusions from the sufficient statistics
approach.
4.1 Structural Model with Wage Effects
Welfare analysis of UI in the presence of a wage distribution has only been attempted once
before to my knowledge, in the aforementioned paper by Acemoglu and Shimer (2000);
this subsection, therefore, represents the first attempt to do so using a wage distribution
covering more than two wages. Job offers now contain a wage y drawn from a distribution
F (y), and an unemployed worker receiving such an offer decides whether to accept or to
remain unemployed. Denoting the reservation wage by y¯, the individual’s recursive decision
42These findings are at least suggestive, but may not be definitive in a North American context, given
the different labour market structures and institutions found in Europe, such as higher union coverage, as
acknowledged by Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007).
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problem is:
Ve(k, y) = max
k′∈Γy(1−τ)(k)
[U((1 + i)k + y(1− τ)− k′) + β[(1− δ)Ve(k
′, y) + δVu(k
′)]]
Vu(k) = max
k′∈Γb(k),y¯,s≥0
[
U((1 + i)k + b− k′)− e(s) + β[sV˜e(k
′, y¯) + (1− s(1− F (y¯)))Vu(k
′)]
]
where V˜e(k
′, y¯) =
∫
y≥y¯
Ve(k, y)dF (y).
To calibrate the model, I now allow for a constant in the search cost function: e(s) =
d + (θs)
1+κ
1+κ
, where d can be thought of as direct disutility from being unemployed; this is
necessary in order to obtain the desired order of magnitude for the effect of UI on wages.
Meanwhile, the wage is defined as y = y+yLN , where y is a constant and yLN ∼ lnN(µ, σ
2);
for the purpose of simulations, a discretized approximation is used with intervals of 0.002 over
a central portion of the distribution and mass points at each end containing the remainder
of the mass, at the mean value for said mass. The parameters are set to match the previous
moments, as well as a mean wage of 1 at baseline and a wage elasticity d ln(E(y))
d ln(b)
= 0.02. To
put this in the context of the estimates in Table 8, recall the two-period model of section 3:
if s = 0.8 and so individuals who lose their jobs spend 20% of the second period unemployed,
this would correspond to a post-unemployment wage elasticity of 0.0926, and dividing by
0.48, the equivalent elasticity among individuals who are receiving UI benefits would be
0.1929, a number that is roughly in the middle of the estimates in Table 8. The parameters
and moments can be found in Tables 12 and 13 in appendix A.2, and the numerical results
are in Table 9.
Table 9: Optimal Replacement Rates & Welfare Gains with Wage Effects
r Welf. Gain Diff.
G = 0.208 0.71 4.27 1.65
G = 0 0.55 0.48 1.64
Allowing for this positive effect on wages leads to dramatically different results from
those observed in Table 4; while the optimal replacement rates are higher in both cases, this
is especially the case for G = 0.208, sufficiently so that fiscal externalities actually lead to
an increase in the optimal benefit level. Therefore, if UI benefits increase reservation wages
and thus subsequent wages by an amount that is conceivable given the existing empirical
estimates, the resulting positive effect on income tax revenues can overturn the earlier con-
clusion of lower optimal UI. A similarly dramatic set of results can be found in appendix B.3
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for the case in which R = 5. This indicates that the results are sensitive to this parameter
and that further empirical work would be beneficial in determining whether or not we should
in fact be ignoring this mechanism.
4.2 Sufficient Statistics with Wage Effects
Compared to the structural approach, accounting for effects of UI on wages is easy in the
sufficient statistics approach. I begin by returning to (7), and while I maintain Assumption
2, I replace Assumption 1 with 1.A:
Assumption 1.A. In the analysis in this subsection, I assume that yn comes from a non-
degenerate distribution, but that in equilibrium yn will be approximately equal to y.
This assumption states that, although yn is chosen by the worker from a non-degenerate
distribution, the value that is chosen in equilibrium is not very different from y. In general,
the optimal level of UI depends both on the level of yn (as that determines the weight placed
on income lost from unemployment) and the elasticity of yn with respect to UI benefits;
Assumption 1.A allows the elasticity to impact the results, as I do not assume dyn
db
= 0, but
fixes the level of yn by assuming it to be equal to y. As in the case of Assumption 2, this
can only be an approximation, since the worker is now allowed to choose yn. Assumption
1.A then allows me to simplify the expression from (7) to (9) as before, and I find the new
expression for the derivative of the government budget constraint:
dτ
db
=
δ(1− s)− δbds
db
− δτy ds
db
− δsτ dyn
db
(2− δ + δs)y
where the fourth term in the numerator is a second “revenue effect” capturing the gain in
tax revenues if higher UI increases yn, reducing the tax increase needed to finance higher
benefits. Equations (11) is now:
Eτb = ψ +
(
ψ +
u
1− u
)
EDb −
δs
2(1− u)
E
y
b (13)
where Eyb =
b
yn
dyn
db
is the elasticity of post-unemployment wages yn with respect to b, and so
the equation for the optimum is:
∆c
c1
R = (1− u)
(
ψ + u
1−u
)
EDb −
δs
2(1−u)
E
y
b
ψ +
(
ψ + u
1−u
)
EDb −
δs
2(1−u)
E
y
b
. (14)
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This equation can be utilized to provide numerical results as before, except that there
are three new statistics to take into account: Eyb , s and δ. I attempt to capture the wide
range of values in Table 8 by using Eyb = 0.48 × {−0.17, 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.64}.
43 Meanwhile,
the starting value s0 depends on the way the structure of the model is interpreted. If the
two periods are taken literally to represent two years, then the finding of Chetty (2008)
that the mean unemployment duration in his sample is 18.3 weeks implies an estimate of
s0 =
52−18.3
52
= 0.648. If, however, the model represents a larger portion of an individual’s
working life, perhaps its entirety, then the fact that Farber (1999) finds that 20.9% of workers
aged 45-64 had at least 20 years of tenure in 1996 can be interpreted to mean that δ = 0.791,
so s0 = 1−
2u0
δ
= 0.863. To cover this range of possibilities, I use the set of values given by
s0 = {0.648, 0.725, 0.8, 0.863}. Then, in each case, the definition u0 =
δ(1−s0)
2
implies a fixed
value of δ.
Table 10 presents the optimal r for my parameter values, as well as the results when I
set G = 0, and I report a numerical check on the second-order conditions in appendix E.
Table 10: Optimal Replacement Rates Calculated from (14)
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.4500 0.4459 0.4390 0.4275
0 0.4595 0.4595 0.4595 0.4595
Eyb 0.048 0.4651 0.4675 0.4717 0.4789
0.096 0.4707 0.4756 0.4842 0.4987
0.192 0.4821 0.4921 0.5095 0.5399
0.3072 0.4959 0.5122 0.5410 0.5922
Optimal r for G = 0.208:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
Eyb 0.048 0.0301 0.2633 0.3933 0.5237
0.096 0.3737 0.4711 0.5959 0.7591
0.192 0.5650 0.6835 0.8514 1.0841
0.3072 0.7152 0.8638 1.0789 1.3788
The difference between the G = 0 and G = 0.208 cases is substantial; as already seen
earlier, for low values of Eyb , fiscal externalities from the income tax cause the optimal
replacement rate to drop to zero, but now we see that for higher values of Eyb , the replacement
rate increases significantly, perhaps even above one. For comparison to the case studied with
the structural model in the previous subsection, I find that the optimal replacement rate with
s0 = 0.8 and E
y
b = 0.0926 is 0.5845. In appendix H, I report results for R = 5 as well, and
show that although the effect of fiscal externalities is less dramatic, the optimal replacement
rates spread out as seen above.
43Since estimates of Eyb are based on samples of UI recipients, I once again multiply by 0.48.
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For comparison with results from Chetty (2008), who only reports the baseline value
of the welfare derivative, I also report the baseline values of dW
db
in appendix F. A direct
comparison to that paper, however, is limited by the fact that the models are different, as
well as by the different ways marginal welfare is normalized into dollars; Chetty divides by
marginal utility when re-employed, while I divide by U ′(cu). The results are qualitatively
similar to those in the tables above, as values of dW
db
cluster around zero when G = 0 but
range from -0.08 to 0.18 when G > 0.
I also examine equation (14) and the underlying equation for dW
db
analytically in appendix
G, where I produce a series of results which are more general than the specific numerical
estimates above. To summarize the main result, I show that fiscal externalities increase the
welfare derivative and b∗ if and only if d(syn)
db
> 0, and since s and yn are the only non-
exogenous components of total earnings, this means that optimal UI increases when G is
accounted for if and only if higher UI leads to higher total income and thus a larger tax base.
I also show that higher Eyb increases both
dW
db
and b∗, and that Eyb has a larger impact on the
welfare derivative when G is larger; in my final result, I show that b∗(G) − b∗(0) follows a
single crossing property in Eyb , so that b
∗(G) < b∗(0) when Eyb is small and vice-versa when
E
y
b is large.
The robustness of the numerical results are also examined through the use of a number of
sensitivity analyses, which can be found in appendix H. First, I try alternative values of EDb ,
specifically, 0.48×{0.3, 0.8}, and unsurprisingly the optimal replacement rates move up in the
former case and down in the latter; the effects of fiscal externalities remain significant in both
cases.44 I then try two alternative values of G, 0.131 and 0.275, and unsurprisingly the effects
of fiscal externalities are less severe in the former case and more so in the latter; zero optimal
UI remains for Eyb < 0 even in the low G case. I also try three other sensitivity analyses:
I consider complete take-up of benefits, I use a larger value of the initial unemployment
rate, specifically u0 = 0.064, and I allow for different tax rates applying to UI benefits and
earned income, specifically 0.15 for the former and 0.262 for the latter. The first two of these
changes reduce the size of the difference between optimal replacement rates with G = 0 and
G > 0, but I still obtain zeros for Eyb = 0, and the analysis with alternative tax rates results
in slightly increased effects of fiscal externalities.
44EDb = 0.144 is small enough to generate a positive local maximum for R = 2 and E
y
b = 0; to obtain a
positive global maximum, I need EDb to drop below 0.096.
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Finally, given the simplicity of the Baily model, I also perform a number of extensions to
the model, which can be found in appendix I. I allow for stochastic duration of unemploy-
ment, and restrictions on borrowing during unemployment, which both tend to move the
optimal replacement rate closer to one, and I use a second-order Taylor series expansion of
marginal utility, and allow for variable labour supply on the initial job, which both reduce
the optimal benefit level. However, although the numerical results do change somewhat, the
results are still quite similar, and the qualitative conclusions are unchanged: the pairwise
comparisons of optimal replacement rates given the two values of G under consideration are
nearly identical in each case.
Therefore, the analysis of this subsection confirms the findings from the structural anal-
ysis: although the optimal replacement rate is zero under standard assumptions, it is highly
sensitive to the effect of UI on wages over the empirically plausible range, and better es-
timates of the wage effects of UI are therefore critical to the determination of the optimal
generosity of UI.
5 Conclusion
The optimal UI literature has explored many of the aspects of the design and generosity of
unemployment insurance systems, but there has not yet been any effort to account for the
role of fiscal externalities, and I have demonstrated in this paper that this is an important
omission. My results demonstrate how substantial an impact fiscal externalities resulting
from income taxes can have on optimal UI calculations, while also indicating the previously
unrecognized importance of parameters such as the elasticity of post-unemployment wages
with respect to UI benefits.
I present results from both of the main approaches in the existing optimal UI literature,
specifically the macro-based structural approach and the sufficient statistics method, and
I consider a wide range of parameter values. The baseline results from both approaches,
using the most typical set of parameters including a zero elasticity of wages with respect
to benefits, feature an optimal replacement rate of zero. However, a value of Eyb that is on
the upper end of recent estimates would be sufficient to offset the negative fiscal effects of
increased durations of unemployment and increase the estimated optimal replacement rate.
The baseline results indicate that the efficiency costs of UI are likely to be more se-
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vere than has previously been recognized, but given the remaining uncertainty about the
appropriate parameter values, specifically the effect of UI on wages and the coefficient of rel-
ative risk-aversion, it would be premature to conclude that UI should be abolished; further
empirical work is needed.
This paper also raises a number of new questions, about how past work on UI policy over
the business cycle may be affected by fiscal externalities, and about the role of active labour
market programs in reducing durations of unemployment and facilitating better matches.
One lesson of this paper is that relatively small improvements in labour market efficiency can
provide significant benefits when the labour market is already highly distorted, suggesting
that the benefits provided by labour market programs considered in Card, Kluve, and Weber
(2010) might be larger than previously realized.
Finally, the insights in this paper can also be generalized into other areas of government
policy. In Lawson (2013a), I apply to post-secondary education an analysis that is similar
to the current paper. Meanwhile, substantial literatures examine the effects of social in-
surance programs on labour market outcomes, not just unemployment insurance but also
disability insurance (see the employment disincentive effects documented in Bound (1989),
Gruber (2000), and Chen and van der Klaauw (2008), for example) and old age security
(e.g. Blau (1994), Rust and Phelan (1997), and Coile and Gruber (2007)). Government
policies regarding health insurance have also been shown to affect incentives for retirement,
job transitions, and entrepreneurship, as documented by Gruber and Madrian (1994), Boyle
and Lahey (2010), and Fairlie, Kapur, and Gates (2011). However, as in the area of UI,
welfare analyses of these programs typically abstract away from other roles of government
(for example, Feldstein (1985) and I˙mrohorog˘lu, I˙mrohorog˘lu, and Joines (1995) on social
security, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) on disability insurance, and the analysis of public
health insurance in Chetty and Saez (2010)), thus ignoring fiscal externalities and leaving
room for future work which addresses their consequences.45 Additionally, the “Second Best”
character of the fiscal externality problem should motivate us to consider more carefully the
45Parry and Oates (2000) recognize the importance of interactions between environmental policies and the
tax system, and argue that this will apply to other programs and institutions that raise the cost of living,
but they do not consider any of the programs mentioned above, restricting their discussion to areas of trade,
agriculture, occupational licensing and monopolies. Some studies of the programs I discuss do take income
taxes that pay for other spending into account, including I˙mrohorog˘lu, I˙mrohorog˘lu, and Joines (2003) and
Laitner and Silverman (2012) in the area of social security, and Gruber (1996) and Bound, Cullen, Nichols,
and Schmidt (2004) on disability insurance, but even in these cases, there is no mention of the importance of
this component or the fact that including it represents an important departure from the rest of the literature.
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second-best nature of other aspects of optimal social program design, and in Lawson (2013b)
I examine how the welfare analysis of state-contingent transfer programs is complicated not
only by fiscal externalities but also by substitution of individuals between various programs.
A Technical Appendix for Structural Calibration
A.1 Baseline Case without Wage Effects
To numerically solve the model for any given set of parameters and a value of b, I begin by making a guess for
the tax rate and performing value function iteration: an initial guess is chosen for the value functions, and
the maximization problem is solved for a range of asset values, which then provides a new guess for the value
functions. This process is repeated until the value functions converge, and I only evaluate the maximization
problem for a subset of the asset value grid on each iteration, and then use cubic spline interpolation to
fill in intermediate points of the value functions, as done by Lentz. Next, the transition process of agents
between states is iterated to calculate the steady-state distribution. I then evaluate the government budget
surplus, and then re-set the tax rate and repeat the above steps until the budget is balanced, except in the
baseline where I know the tax rate is τ0 = 0.23.
In order to calculate Eub , the model must be solved at baseline, and again for a different level of b; since
the numerical procedure involves discretizing the asset distribution, the results are slightly “lumpy” at high
magnification, so I use a replacement rate of r = 0.56, and compute the resulting arc elasticity.46 With both
sets of numerical results in hand, I then estimate the moments of interest in the simulated data and compare
them to their real-world counterparts. Due to the “lumpiness” of the results, a precise numerical search for
the minimum-distance parameters is not feasible; instead, I find values for the parameters that match the
moments as closely as is practical. Finally, in each case, once the parameters have been calibrated, I perform
a grid search over r to find the optimal level.
Table 11 displays the moments calculated from the simulated data. In each case, the upper limit of the
asset distribution was chosen so as to not be binding for all relevant cases, while the number of knots in the
cubic spline was chosen so that increasing it further made no difference to the results. The spacing of the
asset distribution was set at 0.005; if average UI benefits are about $300 per week, then a 46% replacement
rate implies weekly wages of about $650, and the asset distribution spacing corresponds to about $3.25.
Tests were made of all convergence parameters to ensure that further tightening had no non-negligible effect
on results.
Table 11: Calculated Moments
G = 0.208 G = 0
u 0.0539 0.0542
Eub 0.2405 0.2405
E(ce)−E(cu)
E(ce)
0.1001 0.0998
A.2 Parameters and Moments with Wage Effects
Tables 12 and 13 display the parameters and moments when there are effects of UI on wages for R = 2.
46This variation is comparable to that studied in the empirical literature; for example, Addison and
Blackburn (2000) estimate a mean replacement rate of 0.44 with a standard deviation of 0.12 in their data.
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Table 12: Calibrated Parameters with Wage Distribution
G = 0.208 G = 0
ρ 0.01148 0.01147
θ 9.94 9.335
κ 2.94 2.96
d 0.72 0.575
y 0.8041 0.80335
µ -2.344 -2.337
σ 0.776 0.774
Table 13: Calculated Moments with Wage Distribution
G = 0.208 G = 0
u 0.0541 0.0540
Eub 0.2392 0.2397
E(ce)−E(cu)
E(ce)
0.1001 0.1001
Eyb 0.0199 0.0200
E(w) 1.000 1.001
B Sensitivity Analyses and Extension of Structural
Model
B.1 Sensitivity Analyses
I have performed a wide range of sensitivity analyses, to examine how the results change when the parameters
or moments used in calibration are altered. To begin with, as Chetty (2008) states that his results imply a
value of about R = 5 in the context of unemployment,47 I have done the calculations again using that value
of risk-aversion. The parameters used can be found in Table 14, the resulting moments are in Table 15, and
the results are displayed in Table 16. With more risk-averse individuals, optimal UI is more generous, but
the effect of fiscal externalities remains dramatic, with the optimal replacement rate dropping from 72% to
46%.
Table 14: Calibrated Parameters with R = 5
G = 0.208 G = 0
ρ 0.0485 0.0473
θ 92.0 40.3
κ 0.395 0.465
The rest of the sensitivity analyses have been performed for both R = 2 and R = 5, and the results for
each of them can be found in Table 17; the complete sets of resulting parameters and moments are available
upon request.
It is striking how robust the baseline results are to the changes considered. A larger job separation rate
and a larger unemployment rate both leave the results essentially unchanged, as does a modification of the
tax system to allow for a tax rate of 0.15 applying to UI benefits and a rate of 0.262 for earned income.48
47Chetty (2006) argues that such a parameter must be chosen to be consistent with the context in which
it is being considered, and that “empirical studies that have identified large income effects on labor supply
for the unemployed” are inconsistent with low values of R.
48Since Medicare benefits and some state taxes do not apply to UI benefits, I use a conservative estimate of
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Table 15: Calculated Moments with R = 5
G = 0.208 G = 0
u 0.0538 0.0541
Eub 0.2408 0.2407
E(ce)−E(cu)
E(ce)
0.1001 0.0999
Table 16: Optimal Replacement Rates & Welfare Gains with R = 5
r Welf. Gain Diff.
G = 0.208 0.46 0.00 6.08
G = 0 0.72 5.53 5.53
Allowing for perfect take-up or utility from leisure when unemployed modestly reduces the effect of fiscal
externalities, as does matching 0.1001 to the drop in consumption at the moment of job loss rather than the
average consumption gap, though the latter also leads to significantly higher optimal benefit levels; however,
in each of these cases the effect of fiscal externalities remains substantial.
The only case in which the results are dramatically altered is when a positive interest rate is used, as
this reduces optimal replacement rates, perhaps so much as to eliminate the gap in optimal policy in the
R = 2 case, but even then the welfare gain is much larger when fiscal externalities are considered, suggesting
that the zero lower bound is “more binding” in that case. Allowing for lower and higher values of Eub also
shifts the results, unsurprisingly leading to higher and lower optimal replacement rates respectively, but the
effect of fiscal externalities remains significant; the same is true when lower and higher values of G are used.
Finally, intermediate values of R lead to results in between those for R = 2 and R = 5, and it appears that
a risk-aversion coefficient just above two is sufficient to eliminate the zero-optimal-UI result.
B.2 Extension to Finite-Duration Benefits
I now attempt to model more realistically the finite duration of UI benefits; specifically, a period now
represents a month rather than a week, and benefits expire after 6 months. I assume that individuals receive
outside income of 0.1 per period, to ensure that consumption never reaches zero in the uninsured state.
I ignore the question of take-up and simply define the benefit level for an individual receiving benefits as
b = r(1 − τ0); this will tend to bias downwards the importance of fiscal externalities, and means that my
results may be more comparable to those with perfect takeup in Table 17. I also use a different functional
form for the effort cost of search, specifically et(s) = d−
θt
1−κ (1− s)
1−κ− θt
(
s− 11−κ
)
. To capture duration
dependency and ensure that a reasonable proportion of unemployment spells are of long duration and involve
exhaustion of benefits, I allow θt to increase with time t spent out of work according to experimental results
in Kroft, Lange, and Notowidigdo (2012);49 for the same reason, I also set δ = 184 , corresponding to an
expected job duration of 7 years rather than 5. Parameters and moments are in Tables 18 and 19, and the
numerical results are in Table 20.
This more realistic modelling choice makes relatively little difference to the results. The results with
R = 2 are quite similar to those from the baseline, except that the optimal replacement rate in the G = 0
0.15 as the tax rate on UI. Meanwhile, Cushing (2005) uses the Social Security Administration’s projections
of future mortality rates to compute estimated marginal OASDI tax rates, and finds a rate of about 3.2%
for 37-year-olds, which is the mean age of individuals in the SIPP sample of Chetty (2008), implying a total
tax rate of 0.262 on earned income.
49Kroft, Lange, and Notowidigdo (2012) find that the interview-finding rate drops from about 7% to about
4% over the first six months of an unemployment spell, then remains roughly constant. Given a θ1 and a
target search intensity s1, I therefore find the θt for t ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} (where 7 represents all periods of
benefit exhaustion) that generates the same effort cost for st = s1 − (t− 1)s1/14.
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Table 17: Optimal Replacement Rates & Welfare Gains
R = 2 R = 5
r Welf. Gain Diff. r Welf. Gain Diff.
(1 + i)52 = 0.03 G = 0.208 0.01 41.59 0.00 0.00 11.42 7.64
G = 0 0.01 24.17 0.00 0.36 0.26 1.36
δ = 1364 G = 0.208 0.00 11.90 7.27 0.46 0.00 6.72
G = 0 0.38 0.44 6.44 0.73 5.54 5.54
tb = 0.15, ty = 0.262 G = 0.237 0.00 12.76 7.49 0.44 0.11 8.47
G = 0 0.37 0.45 6.43 0.72 5.53 6.28
Eub = 0.1362 G = 0.208 0.12 4.60 3.98 0.67 2.06 3.91
G = 0 0.46 0.02 4.97 0.89 10.31 3.23
Eub = 0.3633 G = 0.208 0.00 19.90 8.96 0.30 2.55 9.07
G = 0 0.32 1.64 6.01 0.59 1.82 7.11
perfect take-up G = 0.205 0.04 9.09 3.75 0.48 0.03 3.32
G = 0 0.34 0.80 4.37 0.66 3.43 2.84
u = 0.07 G = 0.201 0.01 11.70 6.78 0.42 0.19 6.71
G = 0 0.37 0.54 6.16 0.70 4.41 5.74
consumption drop G = 0.208 0.30 2.25 6.30 0.70 4.65 6.50
G = 0 0.59 1.13 5.01 0.90 18.05 4.83
utility from leisure G = 0.208 0.05 9.91 5.96 0.48 0.09 2.80
G = 0 0.39 0.35 6.20 0.65 3.57 2.90
different values of G G = 0.131 0.15 5.82 2.43 0.58 1.01 1.92
G = 0.275 0.00 19.04 12.24 0.35 1.09 12.64
R = 2.5 R = 3
different risk-aversion G = 0.208 0.09 7.82 6.98 0.18 4.62 7.00
G = 0 0.45 0.01 6.13 0.52 0.24 5.95
Table 18: Calibrated Parameters with Finite-Duration Benefits
R = 2 R = 5
G = 0.203 G = 0 G = 0.207 G = 0
ρ 0.0092 0.00915 0.0951 0.0918
θ1 10.45 8.90 0.789 0.3705
κ 1.1 1.1 3.7 3.7
d -0.708 -0.576 -2.266 -0.94346
case is lower, because perfect take-up is assumed here (a 0.28 drop in optimal UI due to fiscal externalities
compares very closely to the 0.30 drop in the perfect take-up case in Table 17). Meanwhile, the results with
R = 5 are even more dramatic, primarily because I allow for outside income of 0.1, so that the consumption-
smoothing effects at lower levels of UI are less dramatic. Thus, given the qualitative similarity of my
results to those with deflated infinite-duration benefits, I conclude that my results are robust to alternative
specifications of UI benefits.
B.3 Results with Wage Effects and R = 5
In this subsection, I present the optimal UI results when unemployment benefits have a positive effect on
wages for R = 5. Tables 21 and 22 display the calibrated parameters and moments, and Table 23 presents
the optimal replacement rates. As before, allowing for a positive effect on wages significantly alters the
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Table 19: Calculated Moments with Finite-Duration Benefits
R = 2 R = 5
G = 0.203 G = 0 G = 0.207 G = 0
u 0.0538 0.0540 0.0539 0.0541
Eub 0.2410 0.2403 0.2411 0.2407
E(ce)−E(cu)
E(ce)
0.1002 0.1002 0.0999 0.1000
Table 20: Optimal Replacement Rates & Welfare Gains with Finite-Duration Benefits
R = 2 R = 5
r Welf. Gain Diff. r Welf. Gain Diff.
G = 0.203/0.207 0.00 10.62 3.84 0.25 1.09 9.41
G = 0 0.28 1.39 2.69 0.72 3.11 7.58
results, with much higher optimal replacement rates of over 100%,50 and a slight increase in optimal UI due
to fiscal externalities.
Table 21: Calibrated Parameters with Wage Distribution and R = 5
G = 0.208 G = 0
ρ 0.0525 0.0534
θ 14.54 11.60
κ 2.31 2.04
d 0.98 0.39
y 0.5475 0.500
µ -1.101 -0.968
σ 0.3823 0.3532
C Proofs and Algebra
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The individual’s first-order condition for saving is:
∂V
∂k
= −U ′(c1) + (1− δ)U
′(ce) + δU
′(cu) = 0
and I also use a first-order Taylor series expansion of U ′(c1) around U
′(cu):
U ′(c1) = U
′(cu) + ∆cU
′′(θ)
where θ is between cu and c1, and ∆c = c1 − cu. Combining these allows me to rewrite (6) as:
dV
db
= −2y∆cU ′′(θ)
dτ
db
− [(2− δ)y + δsyn]U
′(cu)
[
dτ
db
− ω
]
where ω = δ(1−s)(2−δ)y+δsyn .
50The replacement rate applies to a real-world finite-duration benefit, so this does not correspond to a
universal benefit that is always higher than wages.
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Table 22: Calculated Moments with Wage Distribution and R = 5
G = 0.208 G = 0
u 0.0540 0.0542
Eub 0.2418 0.2398
E(ce)−E(cu)
E(ce)
0.1002 0.1002
Eyb 0.0201 0.0196
E(w) 1.002 1.004
Table 23: Optimal Replacement Rates & Welfare Gains with Wage Effects and R = 5
r Welf. Gain Diff.
G = 0.208 1.08 51.98 0.06
G = 0 1.07 41.05 0.29
Next, I make two assumptions that are also found in Baily (1978); they are listed in subsection 3.1
as Assumptions 1 and 2. The first is that the wage distribution is degenerate with yn = y, so all wages
can be written in terms of y. The second assumption is that c1U
′′(θ) = cuU
′′(cu), which permits the
second derivative of utility to be incorporated into a coefficient of relative risk-aversion. The validity of this
assumption depends on the functional form of utility and on the magnitude of risk-aversion; in general it
can only be an approximation. If I assume constant relative risk-aversion, then for my baseline risk-aversion
coefficient of 2, this assumption will tend to overstate the consumption smoothing benefit implied by U ′′(θ)
(that is, −c1U
′′(θ) < −cuU
′′(cu)), and therefore the estimated optimal replacement rate will be too high.
However, simulations (available upon request) confirm that it is a much more accurate assumption than the
usual assumption of U ′(c1) = U
′(cu) + ∆cU
′′(cu).
Combining these two assumptions, and dividing by U ′(cu) to put the welfare derivative in dollar terms,
I find:
dW
db
≡
dV
db
U ′(cu)
= 2y
∆c
c1
R
dτ
db
− 2(1− u)y
[
dτ
db
− ω
]
(15)
where R = −cuU
′′(cu)
U ′(cu)
is the coefficient of relative risk-aversion, and u = δ(1−s)2 is the unemployment rate. At
the optimum, dW
db
= 0, and this will be a unique optimum if W is strictly quasi-concave; thus, the expression
for the optimum is:
∆c
c1
R = (1− u)
dτ
db
− ω
dτ
db
.
Using elasticities, the marginal value of increased benefits is also equal to:
dW
db
=
2u
(1− u)ψ
[
∆c
c1
REτb − (1− u) (E
τ
b − ψ)
]
(16)
where Eτb =
b
τ
dτ
db
is the elasticity of τ with respect to b, and ψ = ωb
τ
= ub
ub+G is the fraction of total government
expenditures allocated to UI; set equal to zero, this gives the following expression for the optimum:
∆c
c1
R− (1− u)
Eτb − ψ
Eτb
.
C.2 Algebraic Analysis of dWdb
In order to prove that dW
db
increases with G if and only if EDb is negative, (16) can also be written as:
dW
db
(b;G) =
2u
1− u
[
∆c
c1
R
Eτb
ψ
− (1− u)
(
Eτb
ψ
− 1
)]
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and therefore we can compare the welfare derivatives when two different values of G are used, 0 and G > 0:
dW
db
(b;G)−
dW
db
(b; 0) =
2u
1− u
[
∆c
c1
R− (1− u)
] [(
Eτb
ψ
)
G>0
−
(
Eτb
ψ
)
G=0
]
.
Using (13) and the definition of ψ:
Eτb
ψ
= 1 + EDb +
ub+G
ub
[
δ(1− s)
2(1− u)
EDb
]
and thus the welfare derivative difference becomes:
dW
db
(b;G)−
dW
db
(b; 0) =
δ(1− s)
(1− u)2b
[
∆c
c1
R− (1− u)
]
EDb G.
Since I assume that ∆c
c1
R < 1− u, this right-hand side will be positive if and only if EDb is negative.
D Summary of Statistical Extrapolation Procedure
In this appendix, I describe the procedure of statistical extrapolation used to numerically evaluate (12) to
find the optimal benefit level. First of all, the optimal UI literature overwhelmingly solves for an optimal
replacement rate rather than a dollar value of UI, so as in the structural analysis earlier, I will do the same.
As before, I define the replacement rate as r = b
(0.8)( 15.824.3 )y(1−τ0)
, where τ0 is the baseline real-world tax rate,
0.8 is the take-up rate, and 15.824.3 is the ratio of mean compensated unemployment duration to mean total
duration. The steps in the procedure used to solve (12) for the optimal replacement rate are as follows:
• select an equation for ∆c
c1
as a function of r
• select fixed values of EDb and R
• select current values of r and u
• use the fixed value of EDb to define a functional form for u with respect to r: u = φr
ED
b , and use the
current values of u and r to solve for φ
• select the current value of ψ, and specify the relationship of ψ to r
• solve the resulting non-linear equation in r
E Second-Order Conditions
For the optimal UI equation (14) to identify the unique maximum, strict quasi-concavity is required, and
I can test this assumption in my numerical analysis by plotting the estimated value of dW
db
at intervals of
0.01 for r ∈ [0.01, 2], for each set of parameter values, and for the initial model as well as all sensitivity
analyses and extensions. I can then see if any failures of quasi-concavity appear over that range; beyond
r = 2, failures of quasi-concavity might be expected on the grounds that Assumptions 1.A and 2 become
especially poor approximations. All plots are available upon request.
For the baseline model, quasi-concavity always appears to be satisfied. However, in the extension to
R = 5, quasi-concavity fails in several cases when G = 0.208: for Eyb ≥ 0.048, there appears to be a local
minimum at low values of r (always less than 0.08). It is not surprising, however, that these violations of
strict quasi-concavity occur at low values of r when R is large, as that is exactly when ∆c
c1
R < 1 − u may
fail to hold and my assumptions will tend to be most inaccurate, and at which the estimated Eτb could
turn negative. Over the vast majority of the range of r that I consider, however, dW
db
behaves normally and
consistent with quasi-concavity.
In each of the sensitivity analyses in appendix H, similar local minima are found at low r for R = 5
and Eyb ≥ 0.048. Additionally, in the case with E
D
b = 0.144, for R = 2, E
y
b = 0 and all s0, I observe local
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maxima at positive values of r with the global maximum at r = 0, as labelled in the results. Finally, in the
perfect-take-up case, for R = 2, Eyb = 0.048 and s0 = 0.648, there is a second local maximum to the right of
the global maximum of r = 0.0393.
Further failures of quasi-concavity are observed in each of the extensions in appendix I; in the first,
second, and fourth extensions, local minima are observed for R = 5 and Eyb ≥ 0.048. The first extension
presents cases for R = 2, Eyb = 0 and s0 ≤ 0.8 where local maxima are observed at positive values of r but
the global maximum is at r = 0. Similar cases are observed thrice in the second extension at high values of
Eyb and s0 for R = 5, though as discussed in appendix I.2, these are anomalous as the optimal replacement
rate should logically be close to one. A second local maximum also occurs in the second extension for R = 2,
Eyb = 0.048 and s0 = 0.648. In the third extension, local maxima are also observed for R = 5, E
y
b = 0, and
each s0, but once again the global maximum is at zero.
F Baseline Values of dW
db
Equation (16), when combined with (13), provides a way of evaluating dW
db
, and I present in Tables 24 and
25 the values of this derivative at the baseline value of r = 0.46, for both R = 2 and R = 5. The results are
conceptually similar to those in Tables 10 and 27, in that a positive value of G causes the values in the table
to “spread out.”
Table 24: Baseline Values of dW
db
Calculated from (16) and (13) for R = 2
Baseline dW
db
for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0016 -0.0025
0 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
E
y
b
0.048 0.0004 0.0006 0.0009 0.0014
0.096 0.0008 0.0012 0.0018 0.0029
0.192 0.0017 0.0024 0.0037 0.0058
0.3072 0.0027 0.0039 0.0059 0.0094
Baseline dW
db
for G = 0.208:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 -0.0418 -0.0487 -0.0605 -0.0805
0 -0.0258 -0.0258 -0.0258 -0.0258
E
y
b
0.048 -0.0165 -0.0124 -0.0054 0.0063
0.096 -0.0071 0.0011 0.0150 0.0384
0.192 0.0117 0.0280 0.0558 0.1027
0.3072 0.0343 0.0602 0.1048 0.1798
Table 25: Baseline Values of dW
db
Calculated from (16) and (13) for R = 5
Baseline dW
db
for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.0430 0.0428 0.0425 0.0420
0 0.0435 0.0435 0.0435 0.0435
E
y
b
0.048 0.0437 0.0438 0.0440 0.0443
0.096 0.0440 0.0442 0.0446 0.0452
0.192 0.0445 0.0449 0.0457 0.0470
0.3072 0.0451 0.0458 0.0470 0.0491
Baseline dW
db
for G = 0.208:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.0185 0.0144 0.0073 -0.0046
0 0.0280 0.0280 0.0280 0.0280
E
y
b
0.048 0.0337 0.0361 0.0402 0.0472
0.096 0.0393 0.0441 0.0524 0.0664
0.192 0.0505 0.0602 0.0768 0.1048
0.3072 0.0640 0.0795 0.1061 0.1509
G Analytical Results
In this section, I will further analyze the equations derived in subsection 4.2, and specifically I will present
a series of analytical results about equations for dW
db
and for the optimal level of UI benefits. I will discuss
dW
db
(b;G), the estimated welfare derivative at a particular value of b given an estimated value of G, and
b∗(G), the estimated optimal value of b for a given value of G. I consider how the results change when
estimated quantities like G and Eyb are changed.
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It should be emphasized that this is not a comparative statics exercise, as I am not considering a change
to a primitive parameter of the model; rather, I consider how the numerical results should be expected
to change when the estimated value of G used in the calculations is altered. This represents a change in
assumptions about the model, not a change in parameters, and so the values of the sufficient statistics are
unaltered, since they reflect the unchanged real world to which the model is calibrated. A helpful thought
experiment is that of the “two researchers”: one who assumes that the true value of G is zero, and another
who has estimated a positive value of G from some real-world data, while they agree on all other sufficient
statistics necessary to calculate the optimum. My analysis answers the question: who will estimate a larger
optimal b, and by how much?
Throughout this section, I maintain two additional assumptions, as in the discussion in subsection 3.2;
the first is that ∆c
c1
R < 1 − u, and the second is that W (the integral of dW
db
) is strictly quasi-concave in
b. I begin with an analysis of how the results change when I alter the selected value of G. The first result
concerns the value of the welfare derivative at a given value of b, and is described in the proposition below.
Proposition 2. For G > 0, dW
db
(b;G)− dW
db
(b; 0) has the same sign as sEyb − (1− s)E
D
b , or equivalently the
same sign as
d(syn)
db
.
Proof. Starting from (16):
dW
db
(b;G) =
2u
1− u
[
∆c
c1
R
Eτb
ψ
− (1− u)
(
Eτb
ψ
− 1
)]
and therefore the difference in welfare derivatives is:
dW
db
(b;G)−
dW
db
(b; 0) =
2u
1− u
[
∆c
c1
R− (1− u)
] [(
Eτb
ψ
)
G>0
−
(
Eτb
ψ
)
G=0
]
.
Using (13) and the definition of ψ:
Eτb
ψ
= 1 + EDb +
ub+G
ub
[
δ(1− s)
2(1− u)
EDb −
δs
2(1− u)
Eyb
]
and thus the welfare derivative difference becomes:
dW
db
(b;G)−
dW
db
(b; 0) =
δ
(1− u)2b
[
∆c
c1
R− (1− u)
] [
(1− s)EDb − sE
y
b
]
G.
Since I assume that ∆c
c1
R < 1− u, this right-hand side will be positive if and only if sEyb − (1− s)E
D
b is
positive. The latter expression can also be written as:
sEyb − (1− s)E
D
b =
sb
yn
dyn
db
+ b
ds
db
=
b
yn
d(syn)
db
.
and therefore dW
db
(b;G)− dW
db
(b; 0) has the same sign as d(syn)
db
.
Therefore, if two researchers use (16) to estimate the baseline welfare derivative, one using G = 0 and
the other a positive value of G, the latter will find a larger welfare gain from increasing b if and only if
d(syn)
db
is positive. Ignoring G greatly understates the revenue effects of changing b, and while higher UI is
expected to increase durations of unemployment, it may also increase wages. If this wage effect is so large as
to lead to an increase in total post-unemployment earnings syn, which is the only non-exogenous component
of total earnings in the model, the overall revenue effect is positive and welfare-increasing. Therefore, using
a positive value of G, which implies higher taxes, amplifies this positive revenue effect and increases the
welfare gain from raising benefits. If d(syn)
db
is negative, the reverse holds.
An immediate corollary arising from quasi-concavity is that, if the baseline welfare derivative is zero for
G = 0, and thus the current level of b is estimated to be optimal in that case, then the optimum for the true
G will be larger or smaller according to the sign of d(syn)
db
. For example, if d(syn)
db
> 0, dW
db
(b;G) > 0 and
quasi-concavity means that the optimum must be found at a higher b. A similar logic applies if dW
db
(b;G) = 0;
if one of the welfare derivatives is zero, I only need to know the other to make a comparison. This result is
summarized by the following corollary.
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Corollary 1. If, for the current value of b, dW
db
(b; 0) = 0 or dW
db
(b;G) = 0, b∗(G) > b∗(0) if and only if
sEyb − (1− s)E
D
b > 0, or equivalently if and only if
d(syn)
db
> 0.
Furthermore, if the welfare derivative is of opposite signs for G = 0 and G > 0, then a comparison of
the estimated optimal values of b is simple; if, for example, dW
db
(b; 0) > 0 and dW
db
(b;G) < 0, then clearly
b∗(0) > b∗(G). For a more general result, however, I need to go beyond the local welfare derivative and make
out-of-sample assumptions; as an illustration, consider Figure 4, which displays graphically how knowledge
of a local welfare derivative doesn’t permit unambiguous conclusions about the optimum.51 Chetty (2009)
recommends the method of statistical extrapolation that has been used by Baily (1978) and Gruber (1997),
in which each sufficient statistic is extrapolated out of sample as described at the end of subsection 3.2. For
this purpose, I define χ = {∆c
c1
, R, s, EDb , E
y
b } as the vector of sufficient statistics, the underlying quantities
in (14) which are not exogenously fixed, and let χ(b) denote a particular vector of extrapolated values of
these quantities.52 This leads to the following corollary.
Figure 4: Two Possible Welfare Functions
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Corollary 2. For statistical extrapolations that do not depend on the estimated value of G, i.e. χ(b;G) =
χ(b), b∗(G) > b∗(0) if and only if sEyb − (1− s)E
D
b > 0, or equivalently if and only if
d(syn)
db
> 0, in between
b∗(0) and b∗(G).
Proof. If a statistical extrapolation is used to find b∗(0), and the same statistical extrapolation is used for
the case of G > 0, then dW
db
(b∗(0);G) takes the same sign as d(syn)
db
at b∗(0). If that sign is positive, then by
strict quasi-concavity b∗(G) > b∗(0), and d(syn)
db
will continue to be positive at least until b∗(G). If the sign
is negative, the opposite is true.
Therefore, if two researchers using G = 0 and G > 0 use the same statistical extrapolations of the
sufficient statistics, then the second researcher’s estimated optimal value b∗(G) will be the larger of the
two if and only if d(syn)
db
> 0 in between the optimal values of b; the proof explains why the sign of d(syn)
db
will not change in that region.53 This is arguably the most important result in this section, and provides
51The values of W in the diagram are normalized to be equal at the initial b, but while it is clear that
dW
db
(b; 0) > dW
db
(b;G) in the diagram, the dotted lines further to the right are meant to indicate that the
sufficient statistics alone give no definite answer about the shape of these curves.
52Strict quasi-concavity of W , when the latter is estimated out of sample using statistical extrapolations,
implicitly places some restrictions on the extrapolations allowed.
53This is not, however, a restrictive assumption relying on quasi-concavity. If everything is continuous,
then a marginal increase in the estimated value of G will lead to a marginal change in the optimal b according
to the sign of d(syn)
db
. Supposing that d(syn)
db
> 0, b∗ will only increase with G as long as it stays in a range
where d(syn)
db
> 0, so it can never increase out of this range, and thus a change in the estimated G can
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general intuition about fiscal externalities, as well as explaining my numerical results. If UI benefits increase
total earnings, this welfare-increasing fiscal externality will appear larger when I account for larger taxes,
and the optimal benefit level will increase. If, on the other hand, the effect of UI on wages is zero, as has
commonly been assumed, the only behavioural effect of benefits will be to increase unemployment, reducing
total earnings, and the fiscal externality will be negative. As demonstrated in the numerical results, the
reduction in the optimal benefit level in this case can be substantial.
Next, I present results on the role of Eyb , to demonstrate that the value of this parameter could be
important;54 these results are straightforward, and begin with the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For Ey2b > E
y1
b ,
dW
db
(b;G,Ey2b ) >
dW
db
(b;G,Ey1b ).
Proof. Combining (16) and (13), I immediately get:
dW
db
(b;G,Ey2b )−
dW
db
(b;G,Ey1b ) =
2u
(1− u)ψ
[
∆c
c1
R− (1− u)
] [
−δs
2(1− u)
] [
Ey2b − E
y1
b
]
. (17)
Given that Ey2b > E
y1
b , and since the middle two terms are both negative, this expression is always positive.
A higher value of Eyb means that b has a more positive effect on wages, meaning a smaller tax increase
to pay for benefits, and thus a larger welfare gain from higher UI. The two following simple corollaries follow
the pattern of the previous two.
Corollary 3. For the current value of b, if dW
db
(b;G,Ey1b ) = 0 or
dW
db
(b;G,Ey2b ) = 0, or if
dW
db
(b;G,Ey1b ) < 0
and dW
db
(b;G,Ey2b ) > 0, b
∗(G,Ey2b ) > b
∗(G,Ey1b ).
Corollary 4. For statistical extrapolations of χ1 = {
∆c
c1
, R, s, EDb } that do not depend on the estimated value
of Eyb , i.e. χ1(b;E
y
b ) = χ1(b), b
∗(G,Ey2b ) > b
∗(G,Ey1b ).
If the current b is the estimated optimal value for one of the values of Eyb under consideration, or if
the signs of dW
db
are opposite, then I can make an unambiguous statement. More generally, once I define a
statistical extrapolation that does not depend on Eyb , I can state that a researcher choosing a larger value
of Eyb will always find a larger optimal b.
I have now shown that higher Eyb increases the optimal value of b, and found the conditions under which
a higher value of G increases or decreases the optimal b; the final analytical results concern the interaction
of G and Eyb . As already mentioned, Baily (1978) is among the few papers that acknowledge the fact that a
parameter like Eyb could enter into optimal UI calculations, but he ultimately drops this parameter from his
equation on the grounds that, since the UI payroll tax is quite small, it will have little effect on the results.
However, Eyb is more important when G is large, both to social welfare and to the calculation of the optimal
value of b; a demonstration of this begins with the following proposition.
Proposition 4. For Ey2b > E
y1
b ,
dW
db
(b;G,Ey2b )−
dW
db
(b;G,Ey1b ) >
dW
db
(b; 0, Ey2b )−
dW
db
(b; 0, Ey1b ).
Proof. I start with (17), and from the definition of ψ:[
dW
db
(b;G,Ey2b )−
dW
db
(b;G,Ey1b )
]
−
[
dW
db
(b; 0, Ey2b )−
dW
db
(b; 0, Ey1b )
]
=
−δs
(1− u)2b
[
∆c
c1
R− (1− u)
] [
Ey2b − E
y1
b
]
G.
This equation is clearly positive.
never move the estimated optimal b enough to change the sign of d(syn)
db
. If there is a value of b for which
d(syn)
db
takes the opposite sign, there must be no value of G such that this b would be optimal. Furthermore,
this prediction is supported for all sets of parameter values in the numerical results: when b∗(G) > b∗(0),
sEyb − (1− s)E
D
b is found to be positive for all b ∈ [b
∗(0), b∗(G)], and vice-versa when b∗(G) < b∗(0).
54The notation is now slightly altered to allow Eyb to enter
dW
db
and b∗ as an argument.
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This proposition says that the effect of Eyb on the welfare derivative is increasing in G. Thus, it may
be true that a researcher who ignores G will find that the value of Eyb is relatively unimportant to their
calculations, but when G is large, the tax rate will also be large, and Eyb will matter far more to the value
of the welfare derivative. Proposition 4 can also be interpreted as saying that the importance of G to the
welfare derivative is increasing in Eyb .
The final analytical result addresses the question of whether Eyb is more important in determining the
value of the optimal b when G is large. The results so far make it logical to suspect that b∗(G;Eyb )−b
∗(0;Eyb )
is increasing in Eyb , i.e. that the increase in b
∗ caused by G is more positive when Eyb is larger; after all, I
have proved that b∗ is increasing in Eyb , and that the difference in the welfare derivative for different values of
Eyb is increasing in G. This suspicion, however, cannot be turned into proof without unusual and unintuitive
assumptions; I can, however, prove a somewhat weaker result, as summarized below.
Proposition 5. For continuous statistical extrapolations that do not depend on the estimated values of G
and Eyb , if
dED
b
db
≥ 0, dR
db
= 0, EDb > −1, and
d
db
(
∆c
c1
1−u
)
< 0, the following is true:
• if ∃ an Ey∗b such that b
∗(G,Ey∗b ) = b
∗(0, Ey∗b ), then b
∗(G,Ey2b ) > b
∗(0, Ey2b ) for E
y2
b > E
y∗
b and
b∗(G,Ey1b ) < b
∗(0, Ey1b ) for E
y1
b < E
y∗
b .
Proof. I begin with the fact that, at the optimum, ∆c
c1
REτb = (1− u) (E
τ
b − ψ); using (13) and rearranging,
this becomes:
∆c
c1
Rψ(1 + EDb )− (1− u)ψE
D
b =
δ
2(1− u)
[
sEyb − (1− s)E
D
b
] [∆c
c1
R− (1− u)
]
.
Observe that, because ∆c
c1
R < 1−u, sEyb−(1−s)E
D
b > 0 at the optimum if and only if
∆c
c1
R(1+EDb )−(1−
u)EDb < 0. I wish to show that b
∗(G,Ey2b ) > b
∗(0, Ey2b ) and b
∗(G,Ey1b ) < b
∗(0, Ey1b ) for E
y2
b > E
y∗
b > E
y1
b ,
so Corollary 2 says that sEyb − (1 − s)E
D
b must be positive for E
y2
b and negative for E
y1
b . Then, if I define
X(b) = ∆c
c1
R(1 + EDb )− (1− u)E
D
b , I want X < 0 at the optimum for E
y2
b and X > 0 for E
y1
b ; given that I
am considering continuous statistical extrapolations, a sufficient and necessary condition is that dX
db
< 0 at
X = 0. The derivative is:
dX
db
= R(1 + EDb )
d
(
∆c
c1
)
db
+
∆c
c1
(1 + EDb )
dR
db
+
∆c
c1
R
dEDb
db
− EDb
d(1− u)
db
− (1− u)
dEDb
db
and at X = 0, ∆c
c1
R(1 + EDb ) = (1− u)E
D
b , and thus:
dX
db
|X=0 =
∆c
c1
(1 + EDb )
dR
db
+
[
∆c
c1
R− (1− u)
]
dEDb
db
+
R(1 + EDb )
(1− u)

(1− u)d
(
∆c
c1
)
db
−
∆c
c1
d(1− u)
db

 .
Sufficient conditions for this to be negative are that dR
db
= 0,
dED
b
db
≥ 0, 1 +EDb > 0 and (1− u)
d
(
∆c
c1
)
db
<
∆c
c1
d(1−u)
db
. The first two assumptions are standard, and I make them in my numerical analysis; dR
db
is
commonly assumed to equal zero, as it would with a CRRA utility function, and Chetty (2006) states that
estimates of
dED
b
db
“are broadly similar across studies with different levels of benefit generosity.” The third
assumption is a formality, as a nearly universal finding of the empirical literature is that EDb is positive. The
final assumption requires a bit more explanation; it is easiest to understand when written as d
db
(
∆c
c1
1−u
)
< 0.
The consumption gap ∆c
c1
is likely to be much smaller than 1 − u, and to decline faster, as the former is
always less than one and could reach or even drop below zero, whereas 1 − u is always at least as large as
1− δ2 . Therefore, this condition is likely to be satisfied in nearly every case of interest, and this assumption
is strongly supported by the numerical results in subsection 4.2 in all cases in which the optimal replacement
rate is above zero; my functional form assumptions cause d(1−u)
db
to become unboundedly large and negative
as benefits approach zero.
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This proposition says that, although I cannot prove the stronger condition that b∗(G;Eyb )− b
∗(0;Eyb ) is
increasing in Eyb , I can state that for small values of E
y
b , b
∗(G,Eyb ) < b
∗(0, Eyb ), and vice-versa for sufficiently
large values of Eyb ;
55 this result is summarized by the diagram in Figure 5. Therefore, at least locally around
Ey∗b , the stronger condition will hold, and I will show in my numerical results that the stronger condition
does describe the general behaviour of b∗ for the parameters and functional forms that I use.
Figure 5: Consequences of Proposition 5
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The results derived in this section apply in particular to UI, but similar results will also apply in the
context of other government programs with impacts on the labour market. The idea that the direction of
the change in optimal policy caused by fiscal externalities depends only on the direction of the program’s
effect on total taxable income is intuitive and more general than the current context, as is the result that
effects of a program on wages are more important when the full size of government is taken into account.
H Sensitivity Analyses in the Baily Model
In this appendix, I present results from a number of sensitivity analyses in the sufficient statistics approach.
I begin by extending the results in Table 7 to a case of R = 5, with results as displayed in Table 26. The
decline in optimal UI due to fiscal externalities is smaller in this case; the difference is generated partly by
the fact that EDb increases with b in the dynamic job search model, whereas it is held fixed during statistical
extrapolations, but also because of other differences in the models, such as the fact that the steady-state
asset distribution changes with b in the structural model.
Next, I again use R = 5 and present results when there may be effects of UI on subsequent wages. Table
27 presents results analogous to those in Table 10. The numerical results are less extreme than they were
for R = 2, but the same pattern of findings is present there as well: when G > 0, the optimal replacement
rates spread out noticeably, becoming more sensitive to both Eyb and s.
55In the unlikely case that an increase in Eyb causes an increase in the optimal b which makes s decrease
sufficiently quickly, the critical value Ey∗b may not exist; in that case, b
∗(G) − b∗(0) is always negative as
long as Eub > 0.
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Table 26: Optimal Replacement Rates & Welfare Gains with R = 5
r Welf. Gain Diff.
G = 0.208 0.5996 4.03 1.68
G = 0 0.6866 10.32 1.58
Table 27: Optimal Replacement Rates Calculated from (14) for R = 5
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.6831 0.6815 0.6787 0.6741
0 0.6866 0.6866 0.6866 0.6866
Eyb 0.048 0.6887 0.6897 0.6914 0.6942
0.096 0.6909 0.6928 0.6962 0.7020
0.192 0.6951 0.6991 0.7061 0.7183
0.3072 0.7004 0.7069 0.7184 0.7390
Optimal r for G = 0.208:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.5518 0.5307 0.4953 0.4387
0 0.5996 0.5996 0.5996 0.5996
Eyb 0.048 0.6276 0.6402 0.6620 0.6987
0.096 0.6554 0.6806 0.7240 0.7970
0.192 0.7102 0.7601 0.8452 0.9853
0.3072 0.7741 0.8523 0.9831 1.1914
I then spend the rest of this appendix considering the sensitivity of my results to a different set of
parameters, for both R = 2 and R = 5. First, I use different values of EDb over a wide range; I try
EDb = 0.48 × 0.3, with results in Tables 28 and 29, and E
D
b = 0.48 × 0.8, with results in Tables 30 and
31. Not surprisingly, the optimal replacement rates move up in the former case and down in the latter; the
effects of fiscal externalities remain sizable in both cases. A value of EDb around 0.144 is where I begin to
observe a positive local maximum when R = 2 and Eyb = 0; for a positive global maximum, I need E
D
b to
drop below 0.096.
Then I try two alternative values of G; in particular, I consider cases with baseline tax rates of 0.15 and
0.30, which imply values of G equal to 0.131 and 0.275 respectively, with results in Tables 32 and Tables 33.
The results are unsurprising, as a lower value of G leads to results that are closer to the G = 0 case, while
higher values imply more extreme effects of fiscal externalities.
Next, I ignore the question of take-up of benefits and only deflate benefits by the ratio of compensated
to total unemployment duration; the ensuing results can be found in Tables 34 and 35. This tends to reduce
the size of the difference between optimal replacement rates with G = 0 and G > 0, but I still observe zeros
for R = 2 and Eyb = 0.
I then try a larger value of the initial unemployment rate, specifically u0 = 0.064. This leads to the
results displayed in Tables 36 and 37. The optimal replacement rates spread out for G = 0, but the effects
are more modest for G > 0, meaning a small reduction in the effect of fiscal externalities.
Finally, instead of using a tax rate of 0.23 to apply to both UI and earned income, I allow for one tax
rate applied to UI benefits and another for earned income; as explained in appendix B.1, I use 0.15 as the
tax rate on UI and 0.262 as the tax rate on earned income. The results are displayed in Tables 38 and 39,
and the effects of fiscal externalities are slightly increased.
I Extensions to Baily Model
This appendix will analyze a variety of extensions to the Baily model, including stochastic duration of un-
employment, within-period borrowing constraints, use of a second-order Taylor series expansion of marginal
utility, and variable labour supply on the initial job. I will present results with both the baseline value of
R = 2 and R = 5, and I will demonstrate that, although the formulas change somewhat in each case, as do
the specific numerical results, the qualitative effects of fiscal externalities change very little.
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Table 28: Optimal Replacement Rates for R = 2 and EDb = 0.144
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.5908 0.5859 0.5776 0.5637
0 0.6020 0.6020 0.6020 0.6020
E
y
b
0.048 0.6087 0.6116 0.6167 0.6254
0.096 0.6154 0.6213 0.6317 0.6494
0.192 0.6289 0.6411 0.6624 0.6997
0.3072 0.6454 0.6653 0.7007 0.7640
Optimal r for G = 0.208:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0 0 0 0
*0 0 0 0 0
E
y
b
0.048 0.5311 0.5824 0.6585 0.7678
0.096 0.6392 0.7181 0.8358 1.0062
0.192 0.8028 0.9254 1.1095 1.3767
0.3072 0.9598 1.1257 1.3739 1.7299
*Local Maximum of 0.3451 for this row
Table 29: Optimal Replacement Rates for R = 5 and EDb = 0.144
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.7391 0.7371 0.7338 0.7283
0 0.7435 0.7435 0.7435 0.7435
E
y
b
0.048 0.7461 0.7473 0.7493 0.7528
0.096 0.7487 0.7511 0.7552 0.7623
0.192 0.7540 0.7589 0.7675 0.7824
0.3072 0.7606 0.7686 0.7828 0.8081
Optimal r for G = 0.208:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.6311 0.6066 0.5656 0.5005
0 0.6874 0.6874 0.6874 0.6874
E
y
b
0.048 0.7208 0.7358 0.7618 0.8058
0.096 0.7543 0.7846 0.8368 0.9253
0.192 0.8212 0.8819 0.9860 1.1588
0.3072 0.9008 0.9968 1.1586 1.4177
Table 30: Optimal Replacement Rates for R = 2 and EDb = 0.384
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.3129 0.3096 0.3039 0.2943
0 0.3213 0.3213 0.3213 0.3213
E
y
b
0.048 0.3262 0.3283 0.3317 0.3376
0.096 0.3312 0.3352 0.3422 0.3541
0.192 0.3411 0.3493 0.3636 0.3882
0.3072 0.3531 0.3664 0.3897 0.4310
Optimal r for G = 0.208:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
E
y
b
0.048 0.0257 0.0544 0.1477 0.3031
0.096 0.1503 0.2551 0.3873 0.5457
0.192 0.3675 0.4800 0.6326 0.8357
0.3072 0.5148 0.6460 0.8312 1.0832
Table 31: Optimal Replacement Rates for R = 5 and EDb = 0.384
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.6292 0.6279 0.6256 0.6219
0 0.6320 0.6320 0.6320 0.6320
E
y
b
0.048 0.6337 0.6345 0.6359 0.6382
0.096 0.6354 0.6370 0.6398 0.6445
0.192 0.6389 0.6421 0.6478 0.6576
0.3072 0.6430 0.6483 0.6576 0.6741
Optimal r for G = 0.208:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.4764 0.4581 0.4273 0.3777
0 0.5182 0.5182 0.5182 0.5182
E
y
b
0.048 0.5422 0.5529 0.5713 0.6021
0.096 0.5659 0.5870 0.6232 0.6836
0.192 0.6117 0.6530 0.7228 0.8365
0.3072 0.6642 0.7279 0.8337 1.0009
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Table 32: Optimal Replacement Rates for R = 2
Optimal r for G = 0.131:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
E
y
b
0.048 0.3124 0.3622 0.4254 0.5071
0.096 0.4133 0.4728 0.5562 0.6709
0.192 0.5359 0.6186 0.7389 0.9089
0.3072 0.6428 0.7500 0.9076 1.1316
Optimal r for G = 0.275:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
E
y
b
0.048 0.0253 0.1354 0.3625 0.5387
0.096 0.3368 0.4696 0.6308 0.8367
0.192 0.5900 0.7397 0.9496 1.2386
0.3072 0.7771 0.9623 1.2287 1.5966
Table 33: Optimal Replacement Rates for R = 5
Optimal r for G = 0.131:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.6071 0.5941 0.5719 0.5353
0 0.6362 0.6362 0.6362 0.6362
E
y
b
0.048 0.6532 0.6610 0.6743 0.6968
0.096 0.6702 0.6857 0.7124 0.7575
0.192 0.7039 0.7349 0.7879 0.8766
0.3072 0.7438 0.7928 0.8762 1.0128
Optimal r for G = 0.275:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.4953 0.4668 0.4201 0.3508
0 0.5621 0.5621 0.5621 0.5621
E
y
b
0.048 0.6014 0.6190 0.6493 0.7007
0.096 0.6403 0.6754 0.7359 0.8372
0.192 0.7165 0.7856 0.9028 1.0933
0.3072 0.8044 0.9114 1.0886 1.3643
Table 34: Optimal Replacement Rates for R = 2 and Perfect Take-Up
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.4500 0.4459 0.4390 0.4275
0 0.4595 0.4595 0.4595 0.4595
E
y
b
0.048 0.4651 0.4675 0.4717 0.4789
0.096 0.4707 0.4756 0.4842 0.4987
0.192 0.4821 0.4921 0.5095 0.5399
0.3072 0.4959 0.5122 0.5410 0.5922
Optimal r for G = 0.205:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
E
y
b
0.048 0.0393 0.3148 0.4086 0.5160
0.096 0.3925 0.4719 0.5775 0.7184
0.192 0.5516 0.6537 0.7996 1.0034
0.3072 0.6821 0.8116 1.0001 1.2649
Table 35: Optimal Replacement Rates for R = 5 and Perfect Take-Up
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.6831 0.6815 0.6787 0.6741
0 0.6866 0.6866 0.6866 0.6866
E
y
b
0.048 0.6887 0.6897 0.6914 0.6942
0.096 0.6909 0.6928 0.6962 0.7020
0.192 0.6951 0.6991 0.7061 0.7183
0.3072 0.7004 0.7069 0.7184 0.7390
Optimal r for G = 0.205:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.5786 0.5614 0.5322 0.4847
0 0.6173 0.6173 0.6173 0.6173
E
y
b
0.048 0.6400 0.6503 0.6679 0.6978
0.096 0.6626 0.6831 0.7184 0.7779
0.192 0.7071 0.7479 0.8176 0.9332
0.3072 0.7595 0.8237 0.9319 1.1064
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Table 36: Optimal Replacement Rates for R = 2 and u0 = 0.064
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.4491 0.4443 0.4362 0.4227
0 0.4603 0.4603 0.4603 0.4603
E
y
b
0.048 0.4670 0.4698 0.4748 0.4833
0.096 0.4736 0.4794 0.4895 0.5069
0.192 0.4871 0.4989 0.5198 0.5562
0.3072 0.5034 0.5228 0.5574 0.6195
Optimal r for G = 0.203:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
E
y
b
0.048 0.0306 0.2725 0.3978 0.5265
0.096 0.3784 0.4743 0.5981 0.7610
0.192 0.5672 0.6853 0.8532 1.0868
0.3072 0.7170 0.8656 1.0813 1.3827
Table 37: Optimal Replacement Rates for R = 5 and u0 = 0.064
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.6828 0.6809 0.6777 0.6723
0 0.6870 0.6870 0.6870 0.6870
E
y
b
0.048 0.6895 0.6906 0.6926 0.6960
0.096 0.6920 0.6943 0.6984 0.7053
0.192 0.6971 0.7018 0.7101 0.7247
0.3072 0.7033 0.7111 0.7249 0.7499
Optimal r for G = 0.203:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.5554 0.5347 0.5003 0.4454
0 0.6023 0.6023 0.6023 0.6023
E
y
b
0.048 0.6299 0.6424 0.6639 0.7003
0.096 0.6574 0.6824 0.7254 0.7981
0.192 0.7116 0.7613 0.8462 0.9863
0.3072 0.7753 0.8532 0.9840 1.1924
Table 38: Optimal Replacement Rates for R = 2 and Multiple Tax Rates
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.4500 0.4459 0.4390 0.4275
0 0.4595 0.4595 0.4595 0.4595
E
y
b
0.048 0.4651 0.4675 0.4717 0.4789
0.096 0.4707 0.4756 0.4842 0.4987
0.192 0.4821 0.4921 0.5095 0.5399
0.3072 0.4959 0.5122 0.5410 0.5922
Optimal r for G = 0.237:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
E
y
b
0.048 0.0294 0.2543 0.3909 0.5249
0.096 0.3708 0.4710 0.5987 0.7653
0.192 0.5670 0.6880 0.8592 1.0963
0.3072 0.7202 0.8717 1.0908 1.3960
Table 39: Optimal Replacement Rates for R = 5 and Multiple Tax Rates
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.6831 0.6815 0.6787 0.6741
0 0.6866 0.6866 0.6866 0.6866
E
y
b
0.048 0.6887 0.6897 0.6914 0.6942
0.096 0.6909 0.6928 0.6962 0.7020
0.192 0.6951 0.6991 0.7061 0.7183
0.3072 0.7004 0.7069 0.7184 0.7390
Optimal r for G = 0.237:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.5476 0.5259 0.4896 0.4317
0 0.5968 0.5968 0.5968 0.5968
E
y
b
0.048 0.6256 0.6387 0.6610 0.6989
0.096 0.6543 0.6802 0.7249 0.8000
0.192 0.7106 0.7620 0.8495 0.9935
0.3072 0.7764 0.8567 0.9911 1.2046
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I.1 Stochastic Duration of Unemployment
I first consider the effect of allowing the duration of unemployment to be stochastic. I follow Baily’s approach
of defining the actual duration of unemployment (1− s˜) as:
(1− s˜) = [1− s(e, yn)] + v
where s is deterministic, and v is a stochastic term with mean zero which is uncorrelated with s.56
If I now denote second-period consumption if the worker loses their job as c˜u, then:
c˜u = (1− s˜)(b− e) + s˜yn(1− τ) + k
= cu − v∆y
where cu is defined as before, and ∆y = yn(1− τ)− (b− e). Utility can now be written as:
V = U [y(1− τ)− k] + (1− δ)U [y(1− τ) + k] + δEv[U(c˜u)].
(4) and (5) now have to be replaced by:
∂V
∂b
= δEv[U
′(c˜u)(1− s+ v)]
∂V
∂τ
= −yU ′(c1)− (1− δ)yU
′(ce)− δynEv[U
′(c˜u)(s− v)].
A first-order Taylor series expansion of U ′(c1) gives U
′(c1) = U
′(cu)+∆cU
′′(θ) as before, and I perform
a similar expansion of U ′(c˜u):
U ′(c˜u) = U
′(cu) + U
′′(γ)(c˜u − cu)
= U ′(cu)− v∆yU
′′(γ)
where γ is somewhere between cu and c˜u. Upon reaching this point in the calculations, Baily (1978) implicitly
makes an assumption that he does not state explicitly, which is that U ′′(γ) is uncorrelated with v and v2,
capturing an intuition that the average first and second derivatives shouldn’t be too far from the respective
derivatives at the average cu, as well as greatly simplifying the algebra. I make the same assumption, and
therefore:
Ev[U
′(c˜u)] = U
′(cu)
Ev[U
′(c˜u)v] = −∆yEv[U
′′(γ)]V ar(v).
As a result, the individual’s first-order condition for savings can now be written as:
∂V
∂k
= −U ′(c1) + (1− δ)U
′(ce) + δU
′(cu) = 0
As before, I make the assumptions that yn = y and c1U
′′(θ) = cuU
′′(cu), and to this I add the assumption
that E[U ′′(γ)] = U ′′(θ), which will tend towards underestimating the welfare gain from raising b. I then
combine the results above and write the welfare derivative as:
dW
db
= 2y
∆c
c1
R
dτ
db
+ δ
∆y
c1
RV ar(v) + δy
∆y
c1
RV ar(v)
dτ
db
− 2(1− u)y
[
dτ
db
− ω
]
.
which can also be written as:
dW
db
=
2u
(1− u)ψ
[
∆c
c1
R+
∆y
c1
RV ar(v)
1− s
]
Eτb −
2u
ψ
[
1 +
∆y
c1
RV ar(v)
1− s
]
[Eτb − ψ]
56As noted by Baily, this can only be an approximation given that (s− v) is constrained to lie in (0, 1).
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The budget constraint takes an expectation over all workers, and so is unchanged, and the equation for
the optimum is:
∆c
c1
R+
∆y
c1
RV ar(v)
1− s
= (1− u)
[
1 +
∆y
c1
RV ar(v)
1− s
]
Eτb − ψ
Eτb
. (18)
If I make the same assumptions as Baily, then this formula collapses to that used in his extension to
stochastic unemployment durations. Most of the terms in (18) have exactly the same interpretation as
before, or, as in the case of u and s, still work as averages or expectations, but there are two new terms
to consider: ∆y
c1
and V ar(v). The latter is also the variance of the duration of unemployment (1 − s), and
to evaluate this parameter, I turn to Chetty (2008), who estimates a mean duration of unemployment of
18.3 weeks, and a standard deviation of 14.2, so I normalize the standard deviation by the mean and write
std(v) = 14.218.3 (1 − s0), and therefore V ar(v) =
(
14.2
18.3
)2
(1 − s0)
2.57 Meanwhile, in the absence of any better
evidence, I will use Baily’s assumption that ∆y
c1
= 1− r. Evaluation of (18) then gives the results displayed
below in Tables 40 and 41.
Table 40: Optimal Replacement Rates Calculated from (18) for R = 2
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.6529 0.6208 0.5812 0.5367
0 0.6590 0.6303 0.5969 0.5630
E
y
b
0.048 0.6626 0.6360 0.6063 0.5790
0.096 0.6662 0.6417 0.6157 0.5954
0.192 0.6735 0.6532 0.6351 0.6292
0.3072 0.6824 0.6673 0.6590 0.6720
Optimal r for G = 0.208:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
E
y
b
0.048 0.5444 0.5334 0.5455 0.6008
0.096 0.6034 0.6225 0.6788 0.7921
0.192 0.7003 0.7611 0.8779 1.0739
0.3072 0.7962 0.8945 1.0658 1.3354
Table 41: Optimal Replacement Rates Calculated from (18) for R = 5
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.7961 0.7779 0.7560 0.7322
0 0.7986 0.7819 0.7626 0.7432
E
y
b
0.048 0.8002 0.7843 0.7665 0.7499
0.096 0.8017 0.7867 0.7705 0.7567
0.192 0.8048 0.7916 0.7786 0.7708
0.3072 0.8085 0.7975 0.7887 0.7887
Optimal r for G = 0.208:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.7138 0.6756 0.6202 0.5423
0 0.7427 0.7215 0.6969 0.6722
E
y
b
0.048 0.7597 0.7486 0.7428 0.7519
0.096 0.7767 0.7758 0.7888 0.8317
0.192 0.8107 0.8300 0.8803 0.9877
0.3072 0.8510 0.8942 0.9868 1.1623
As can be seen, allowing for an uncertain duration of unemployment tends to make the optimal rate closer
to one, since the desire to provide full insurance is made greater by the uncertainty; this means a decrease in
cases where the optimal rate was above one, as it is no longer as desirable to “over-insure” when unemployed
individuals face uncertainty about duration. The qualitative conclusion remains the same, however, regarding
the effect of the fiscal externality from income taxes: the optimal replacement rate decreases for lower values
of s and especially Eyb , whereas it increases for higher values. Indeed, the pairwise comparisons between the
side-by-side tables are identical in the sense that, if the optimal replacement rate is higher for G = 0 than
for G = 0.208 in Table 10 or 27, the same is true in Table 40 or 41, and vice-versa.
57There are potential offsetting biases in these calculations; Chetty (2008) uses a sample in which the
duration of unemployment is truncated at 50 weeks, suggesting I may be underestimating V ar(v), but
on the other hand, Chetty’s is an unconditional variance, some of which may be explained by individual
characteristics, which means V ar(v) may be an overestimate.
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I.2 Within-Period Borrowing Constraints
Another unrealistic feature of the basic two-period model is the assumption that individuals can not only
save or borrow as much as they want across periods, but that they can also perfectly smooth consumption
within the second period. Recent work, in particular that of Chetty (2008), has emphasized the importance
of liquidity constraints among the unemployed and the beneficial role of UI in loosening these constraints.
I will therefore consider the case of no borrowing during unemployment; I assume that utility is additively
time-separable within the second period, so that second period utility of a worker who loses their job
is (1 − s)U(cu) + sU(cn), where cu is now per-period consumption while unemployed and cn is per-period
consumption when re-employed in a new job.58 I also assume that, if a worker loses their job, any savings from
the first period are completely consumed while unemployed; none of those savings are kept for consumption
when re-employed.59 I can therefore write total utility as:
V = U [y(1− τ)− k] + (1− δ)U [y(1− τ) + k] + δ
[
(1− s)U
(
(b− e) +
k
1− s
)
+ sU (yn(1− τ))
]
.
(4) still holds, and (5) is now replaced by:
∂V
∂τ
= −yU ′(c1)− (1− δ)yU
′(ce)− δsynU
′(cn).
I replace U ′(ce) using the first-order condition for saving, as before, and I assume that cn = c1, which
is generally consistent with the finding in Gruber (1997) that workers who lose their job in one year but
are re-employed in the following year see their consumption return to within 4% of their pre-unemployment
consumption. Combining this with the usual Taylor series expansion of U ′(c1):
∂V
∂τ
= −[(2− δ)y + δsyn]U
′(cu)− [2y + δsyn]∆cU
′′(θ).
Putting this together with (4):
dW
db
= [2 + δs]y
∆c
c1
R
dτ
db
− 2(1− u)y
(
dτ
db
− ω
)
and therefore the equation for the optimum is:
∆c
c1
R =
2(1− u)
2 + δs
Eτb − ψ
Eτb
. (19)
Eτb is the same as before, so this equation is almost identical to (9), and it is easy to introduce the extra
δs term into the calculations. Solving for the optimal replacement rate generates the results found in Tables
42 and 43.
The pattern of the results changes a little, as the optimal replacement rates generally tend to move
closer to one (or more precisely, closer to 0.2220.265 ). In a few cases with R = 5 and high E
y
b and s0, anomalous
results occur in which the local maximum obtained at a replacement rate near one is not estimated to be the
global maximum, which appears to occur at zero. In these cases, the assumption that unemployment goes
to zero as benefits go to zero is partly responsible, as is a failure of an assumption that ∆c
c1
R < 2(1−u)2+δs .
60
However, aside from these cases, the changes tend to be quite small, surprisingly so given the shift in the
58Chetty (2006) argues that, in his model, the nature of borrowing constraints does not change the optimal
UI formula, as this effect will simply show up in the magnitude of the consumption drop. In a sense, this
is correct in my analysis as well, but how I interpret borrowing constraints changes what I call the value of
consumption during unemployment; I previously defined cu as the total consumption in the second period if
a worker experiences a spell of unemployment, whereas I now define cu to be consumption while unemployed.
59Given that unemployment durations are deterministic, as long as yn is not too far from y, there is no
reason for a worker to save more than they would want to consume in a spell of unemployment.
60 ∆c
c1
R > 2(1−u)2+δs implies
∂V
∂τ
> 0, while I also estimate that dτ
db
< 0.
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Table 42: Optimal Replacement Rates Calculated from (19) for R = 2
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.4850 0.4947 0.5098 0.5316
0 0.4934 0.5063 0.5263 0.5551
E
y
b
0.048 0.4985 0.5133 0.5362 0.5694
0.096 0.5035 0.5203 0.5463 0.5841
0.192 0.5137 0.5344 0.5670 0.6146
0.3072 0.5260 0.5518 0.5926 0.6534
Optimal r for G = 0.208:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
E
y
b
0.048 0.2384 0.3621 0.4716 0.5905
0.096 0.4156 0.5095 0.6274 0.7723
0.192 0.5821 0.6956 0.8500 1.0509
0.3072 0.7216 0.8621 1.0577 1.3160
Table 43: Optimal Replacement Rates Calculated from (19) for R = 5
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.6963 0.7002 0.7063 0.7151
0 0.6995 0.7047 0.7128 0.7244
E
y
b
0.048 0.7014 0.7074 0.7167 0.7301
0.096 0.7034 0.7102 0.7207 0.7359
0.192 0.7073 0.7157 0.7289 0.7481
0.3072 0.7120 0.7225 0.7390 0.7636
Optimal r for G = 0.208:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.5825 0.5775 0.5721 0.5697
0 0.6229 0.6318 0.6456 0.6649
E
y
b
0.048 0.6470 0.6651 0.6929 0.7324
0.096 0.6713 0.6991 0.7422 0.8057
0.192 0.7202 0.7681 0.8442 *0/0.9604
0.3072 0.7786 0.8510 *0/0.9669 *0/1.1440
*Global Maximum/Local Maximum
nature of borrowing constraints, as zeros still occur for R = 2 and low values of Eyb , and the qualitative
comparisons are similar to those from the basic model. One explanation for this is that I still allow for
unrestricted savings in the first period, so workers take into account the borrowing constraints in the second
period when they make their savings decision, and the desire for within-period consumption smoothing may
be fairly small. Additionally, using the same expression for ∆c
c1
when I have redefined cu to be consumption
while unemployed will tend to shift the results downwards, offsetting the tendency of optimal benefit levels
to increase.
I.3 Second-Order Taylor Series Expansion of Marginal Utility
Chetty (2006) argues that ignoring third and higher derivatives of the utility function may be a mistake; he
reports that, for simulation exercises using a CRRA utility function, using a first-order expansion of marginal
utility can sometimes lead to an underestimate of the true optimal replacement rate on the order of 30%,
whereas a revised welfare equation using a second-order expansion reduces this error to less than 4%. The
model used by Chetty (2006) is somewhat different from mine, and he writes all marginal utilities in terms
of consumption while employed rather than U ′(cu), so the results are not directly comparable.
61 However,
I will now explore how the results change when I use a second-order Taylor series expansion of marginal
utility.
To do so, I must follow the approach of Chetty (2006) and rewrite my expression in terms of U ′(c1)
rather than U ′(cu), although this will hinder the comparability of my results with those of the baseline case.
I begin with (4) and (5), and the standard first-order condition for saving. Next, I use a new Taylor series
61The first-order Taylor series used in my paper is in fact an exact equality, not an approximation; it is
the assumption that c1U
′′(θ) = cuU
′′(cu) which generates the potential for error. As already discussed, that
assumption tends to be a liberal one, but Chetty’s effective assumption that U ′′(θ) is equal to U ′′ at the
average level of consumption while employed is a conservative one in his context, which explains why this
leads to an underestimate in his paper. Baily’s assumption that the Eτb in the denominator of the right-hand
side of (9) is equal to one is, in the context of his model, a significant reason for underestimation of the
optimal b.
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expansion of U ′(cu) around U
′(c1):
U ′(cu) = U
′(c1)−∆cU
′′(c1) + ∆c
2U
′′′(θ)
2
where θ is not necessarily the same value as before, but is still between c1 and cu. Using this to replace
U ′(cu) in both (4) and (5):
dV
db
= 2u
[
U ′(c1)−∆cU
′′(c1) + ∆c
2U
′′′(θ)
2
]
−
[
[(2− δ)y + δsyn]U
′(c1) + δ(y − syn)
(
∆cU ′′(c1)−∆c
2U
′′′(θ)
2
)]
dτ
db
.
I make the usual assumption that yn = y, and add the modified assumption that θ = c1, and then a bit
of rearranging gives:
dW1
db
≡
dV
db
U ′(c1)
= 2y
(
∆c
c1
R+
1
2
(
∆c
c1
)2
RP
)
dτ
db
− 2(1− u)y
(
1 +
∆c
c1
R+
1
2
(
∆c
c1
)2
RP
)[
dτ
db
− ω
]
where P = −c1U
′′′(c1)
U ′′(c1)
is the coefficient of relative prudence. Therefore, the equation for the optimum is:
(
∆c
c1
R+
1
2
(
∆c
c1
)2
RP
)
= (1− u)
(
1 +
∆c
c1
R+
1
2
(
∆c
c1
)2
RP
)
Eτb − ψ
Eτb
(20)
where Eτb is unchanged thus and still given by (13).
I can use parameter values and functions as before, but there is one additional parameter to select: the
coefficient of relative prudence. In a CRRA utility function U(c) = c
1−R
1−R , P =
−cU ′′′(c)
U ′′(c) = R + 1, so one
possibility is to set P = R + 1. However, previous studies have tended to find low estimates of relative
prudence; Merrigan and Normandin (1996) are on the high end of the results in the literature when they find
estimates ranging from 1.78 to 2.33.62 I will therefore use a value of P = 2, and the results from evaluation
of the optimal replacement rate are displayed in Tables 44 and 45.
Table 44: Optimal Replacement Rates Calculated from (20) for R = 2
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.4000 0.3947 0.3858 0.3707
0 0.4124 0.4124 0.4124 0.4124
E
y
b
0.048 0.4196 0.4227 0.4281 0.4371
0.096 0.4269 0.4331 0.4438 0.4620
0.192 0.4414 0.4539 0.4755 0.5124
0.3072 0.4588 0.4788 0.5138 0.5741
Optimal r for G = 0.208:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
E
y
b
0.048 0.0238 0.0963 0.3317 0.5013
0.096 0.3073 0.4384 0.5843 0.7581
0.192 0.5502 0.6794 0.8513 1.0768
0.3072 0.7128 0.8637 1.0720 1.3510
The results this time are somewhat different quantitatively, in that optimal replacement rates are zero
for low values of Eyb even for R = 5. However, the qualitative comparison remains the same, right down to
nearly the exact same pairwise comparisons: at low values of s and especially Eyb , the fiscal externality term
considerably reduces the optimal replacement rate, whereas at higher values it considerably increases it.
62Eisenhauer and Ventura (2003) are an exception in finding values of R and P in the 7 to 8 range, but
they base their estimation on answers regarding willingness to pay for a security from a Bank of Italy survey
of Italian households.
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Table 45: Optimal Replacement Rates Calculated from (20) for R = 5
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.6522 0.6499 0.6549 0.6392
0 0.6574 0.6574 0.6574 0.6574
E
y
b
0.048 0.6604 0.6618 0.6641 0.6682
0.096 0.6634 0.6662 0.6709 0.6790
0.192 0.6695 0.6750 0.6846 0.7008
0.3072 0.6768 0.6857 0.7011 0.7274
Optimal r for G = 0.208:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
E
y
b
0.048 0.5565 0.5817 0.6201 0.6760
0.096 0.6095 0.6499 0.7101 0.7955
0.192 0.6922 0.7543 0.8452 0.9717
0.3072 0.7704 0.8521 0.9700 1.1313
I.4 Variable Labour Supply
To this point, I have assumed that y is fixed, and thus ignored any distortionary effects of taxes on labour
supply among the employed. Chetty (2006) points out that, with a lump-sum tax on workers, the envelope
condition means that whether or not individuals can change the amount of their labour supply while employed
is irrelevant to the optimal UI calculation. However, with a proportional tax, changes in y have an effect
though the government budget constraint. Saez (2002) argues that much of the responsiveness of modest-
income workers is on the extensive margin, which is already largely captured here by the decision about
whether or not to seek work, but all the same I will examine how significant this effect could be. I begin by
rewriting the utility function to allow for choice of y, assuming that the worker must make the same choice
of y in both the first and second periods if they retain their job. If disutility from work effort, which I denote
as h(y), is separable from consumption, (1) becomes:
V = U [y(1− τ)− k] + (1− δ)U [y(1− τ) + k]− (2− δ)h(y) + δU [(1− s)(b− e) + syn(1− τ) + k]− δh(syn).
Because (4) and (5) are unchanged, both (8) and (9) remain valid; the only change is to the derivative
of the government budget constraint. The latter now becomes:
dτ
db
=
δ(1− s)− δbds
db
− δτyn
ds
db
− δsτ dyn
db
− (2− δ)τ dy
db
(2− δ)y + δsyn
.
and rewritten in terms of elasticities, this is equivalent to:
Eτb = ψ + ψE
u
b +
u
1− u
EDb −
δs
2(1− u)
Eyb −
2− δ
2(1− u)
εyb (21)
where εyb =
b
y
dy
db
.
I now have to decide on a value for εyb . When b increases, τ increases as well - unless E
y
b is so large as
to actually lead to increased tax revenues, which cannot be the case in equilibrium - so some version of an
elasticity of taxable income is required. Gruber and Saez (2002) find an elasticity of taxable income with
respect to the net-of-tax rate of 0.4;63 using this, and assuming that the only effect of changes in b and τ on
y go through the channel of taxes:
εyb =
dy
db
b
y
=
dy
dτ
dτ
db
b
y
= −0.4
b
1− τ
dτ
db
.
To simplify the calculations, I replace dτ
db
with the partial derivative:
εyb ≃ −0.4
b
1− τ
[
δ(1− s)
((2− δ)y + δsyn
]
≃ −0.4
τ
1− τ
ψ.
Finally, I use the baseline tax rate of τ = 0.23, so my estimate of the elasticity is εyb =
−0.092
0.77 ψ; I do not need
to multiply this by 0.48, as this estimate is meant to apply to the entire universe of workers. The ensuing
numerical results are displayed in Tables 46 and 47.
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Table 46: Optimal Replacement Rates Calculated from (9) and (21) for R = 2
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.3412 0.3428 0.3456 0.3503
0 0.3496 0.3548 0.3638 0.3791
E
y
b
0.048 0.3546 0.3619 0.3746 0.3966
0.096 0.3596 0.3691 0.3856 0.4144
0.192 0.3697 0.3835 0.4080 0.4513
0.3072 0.3818 0.4012 0.4356 0.4978
Optimal r for G = 0.208:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
E
y
b
0.048 0.0270 0.1511 0.3125 0.4579
0.096 0.2854 0.3886 0.5185 0.6897
0.192 0.4809 0.5989 0.7670 1.0039
0.3072 0.6279 0.7733 0.9855 1.2867
Table 47: Optimal Replacement Rates Calculated from (9) and (21) for R = 5
Optimal r for G = 0:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.6399 0.6406 0.6417 0.6435
0 0.6430 0.6450 0.6486 0.6547
E
y
b
0.048 0.6448 0.6477 0.6527 0.6615
0.096 0.6466 0.6504 0.6569 0.6684
0.192 0.6503 0.6558 0.6656 0.6828
0.3072 0.6548 0.6625 0.6763 0.7011
Optimal r for G = 0.208:
s0
0.648 0.725 0.8 0.863
-0.0816 0.5198 0.5020 0.4719 0.4229
0 0.5639 0.5656 0.5685 0.5735
E
y
b
0.048 0.5898 0.6033 0.6266 0.6669
0.096 0.6156 0.6408 0.6846 0.7598
0.192 0.6666 0.7149 0.7983 0.9385
0.3072 0.7263 0.8012 0.9282 1.1345
The inclusion of the labour supply elasticity tends to lower the optimal replacement rate, though in
many cases not by much; in the R = 5 case, the effect is often almost negligible, whereas in the R = 2
case the effect can be somewhat larger for moderate values of Eyb . However, the essential point remains that
consideration of fiscal externalities can greatly change the results, either in a positive or negative direction;
the pairwise comparisons are again nearly identical to the baseline.
I.5 Summary of Extensions
In each of the four extensions considered, altering the model generally does change the numerical results;
allowing for a stochastic duration of unemployment or second-period borrowing constraints tends to move
the optimal replacement rates closer to one, whereas allowing for variable y or using the third derivative
of marginal utility tends to reduce the estimated optimal replacement rate. These results, however, are all
remarkable similar in terms of what they tell us about the importance of fiscal externalities; even the pairwise
comparisons of optimal replacement rates given G = 0 versus G = 0.208 are nearly identical in each case.
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